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1 Introduction 
Among the many challenges facing multinational petroleum companies making investments 
abroad, there has been an increased focus on the many pitfalls originating from the political 
and social environment of host countries. In 2005, for example, the Venezuelan government, 
under the lead of President Hugo Chavez, passed a resolution, which increased income taxes 
from four heavy-oil projects from 36% to 50%. Being an integrated part of a strategy aimed at 
securing national control over the country’s substantial petroleum resources, the resolution is 
assumed to have had direct impact on the operations of multinational petroleum companies 
such as Exxon Mobil, Chevron, BP and Statoil. In Africa, foreign operations in the largest oil 
exporting country, Nigeria, have long been plagued by kidnappings and sabotage against 
employees and production facilities. Usually portrayed as a result of poverty and ethnical 
unrest in the region surrounding the delta of river Niger, this has, among other things, forced 
Shell to start budgeting with “protection money” to local big men and bribery money to 
corrupt Nigerian courts (Jakobsen 2007: 8).    
As the abovementioned examples clearly illustrate, making investments abroad does mean 
that multinational petroleum companies are becoming exposed to political risk, which if 
materialised, could lead to reduced cash flows or lost property. However, as political risk is 
not merely a question about impact, but also a matter of likelihood, a high degree of perceived 
political risk may also undermine upstream foreign direct investments (FDI) through yet 
another channel. Caused by the perceived necessity of preventive and sometimes costly 
measures, such as the hiring of security specialists, strategies for establishing local content, 
and the signing of expensive political risk insurances, multinational petroleum companies 
may at the end conclude that the potential payoffs are outweighed by the costs of protecting 
themselves against future dangers that may harm their businesses. Potentially leading to 
inefficient use of petroleum resources and reduced supply caused by underinvestment in 
upstream ventures, in a market characterised by increasing demand and strong competition 
over access to the world’s oil and gas fields, finding ways to effectively handle and mitigate 
political risk should therefore be a main concern to CEOs and governments around the globe.  
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1.1 Research question 
Following a line of research, which can be traced back to the late 1950s, scholars, such as 
Stephen Kobrin, Stefan H. Robock, Raymond Vernon and John H. Dunning have made 
valuable contributions to improve our understanding of how host country politics affect 
inward FDI. Initially being oriented towards identification and classification of risk factors, 
the so-called “catalogue approach”, the research then moved towards more focus on political 
risk as being embedded within the process of modernization: the so-called System-Event 
School or Robock´s Process School (Jarvis 2008: 19-76). Despite being unable to explain the 
causal relationship between political risk and investments, these approaches did pave way for 
a third generation of research, which through scenarios and expert surveys, sought to give 
“informative appraisals of the risk environment in relation to industry or project specific 
applications” (ibid.: 43).  
Building on the abovementioned research, this thesis approaches the proposed relationship 
between political risk and FDI by placing multinational petroleum companies and their 
investment allocation decisions at the centre of attention. There are three reasons for choosing 
this approach. First, as petroleum companies are responsible for bringing petroleum resources 
from the ground to the gas stations and manufactories, their ability to mitigate political risk is 
critical for the functioning of world production. Second, there are theories that suggest that 
political risk is particularly persistent within the petroleum industry, as these are resources of 
high strategic importance and low factor mobility. Third and finally, instead of only focusing 
on political risk factors, on which an individual company may have limited influence, it might 
be more fruitful to consider the influence of political risk as a result of interactions between 
political risk sources and the properties that decide a companies’ risk mitigation capacity. 
Based on these assumptions I have formulated the following research question:   
How does multinational petroleum companies´ ability to handle political risk influence 
the geographical allocation of upstream foreign direct investment?   
To address the research question, which is illustrated in figure 1.1, I will apply the OLI 
framework as the theoretical point of departure (Dunning 1980). Aimed at explaining what 
determine the scope, geographical distribution and composition of FDI, the OLI framework 
identifies three types of advantage. First, there are ownership specific advantages (from here 
O-specific advantages), which seek to explain how a company’s competitive advantage may 
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galvanise, and in this case, determine the scope and allocation of FDI. Second, as the 
magnitude and allocation FDI also depend on host countries characteristics, locational 
advantages, or in this case, disadvantages are also important to explain why companies 
expand their business across borders. Finally, there are internalisation advantages, which offer 
explanations for why companies may find it more profitable to subsume parts of, or the whole 
production chain under the formal command of the company.
 
Figure 1.1 Political risk, O-specific advantages and upstream FDI 
While all being important determinants of FDI, in the following analyses, O-specific 
advantages will be given most attention, as these are considered to be most critical in 
determining the risk mitigation capacity of multinational petroleum companies. Further, 
representing an eclectic framework about the determinants of FDI, the OLI framework does 
not offer specific suggestions about how political risk affects the allocation of FDI and how 
O-specific advantages can contribute in mitigating these risks. Thus, it is necessary to 
complement the OLI framework with theories that are more specific in their claims about how 
political risk is generated and how political risk influences the investment climate. As the 
number of potential sources of political risk greatly exceeds the practical boundaries of this 
thesis, I have chosen to concentrate on the effects of 1) the political regime, 2) political 
instability, 3) human development, 4) regulatory quality, and 5) the control of corruption. To 
explain why and how these country characteristics arise as sources of political risk this thesis 
deploys a wide range of theories, from which the working hypotheses are subsequently 
formulated. 
In the attempt to answer the research question, this thesis applies a quantitative approach, in 
which the method of choice is logistic multilevel regression modelling. The reason for 
choosing this method is that it allows for regression analyses of structured data, of which the 
assumption of independent observations is violated. Furthermore, as the focal point in the 
upcoming analyses is to test if interactions between political risk and O-specific advantages 
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offer statistically valid explanations of the geographical allocation of upstream FDI within the 
petroleum industry, cross-level interaction terms are included in the analysis. As will be 
debated more thoroughly below, this has some important implications for how the results are 
interpreted. 
1.2 Political risk and corporate finance 
When deciding where to allocate foreign direct investments, multinational petroleum 
companies, with limited resources are, according to Osmundsen et al. (2006a: 105) 
predominately concerned with the materiality of the investment project. As multinational 
petroleum companies incur fixed area costs when entering into a country or area, the 
materiality, which is “a function of the expected after tax cash flows and the discount rate”, is 
required to be of a certain size to be interesting to multinational petroleum companies (ibid.: 
106). Political risk may influence the materiality through at least four channels. First, as 
political risk increases uncertainty over future returns, to justify the expenditures associated 
with exploration and production, multinational petroleum companies will increase demands of 
future returns when upstream investments projects are compared with alternative capital 
allocations, such as other destinations, stocks and bank deposits. In other words, political risk 
should lead multinational petroleum companies to discount future returns more heavily. 
Second, if already present in a country, political risk could, if materialised, lead to disrupted 
cash flows and lost equity shares through politically motived actions such as terrorism, 
sabotage and hostile government policies. Clearly reducing the cash flow from the 
investment, this may lead companies to withdraw from the country.     
Third, besides being concerned with future cash flows, company costs are also affecting the 
materiality of an investment project. Defined by Osmundsen et al. (2006a: 118) as costs, 
“which are usually not included in calculations of the anticipated cash flow”, these costs are 
critical when companies make decisions of whether to invest in a country or not. From this 
then it seems obvious that a high degree of perceived political risk would lower the prospects 
of entry, as necessary, but often costly measures, such as the signing of political risk 
insurances and strategies of corporate social responsibility (CSR), would decrease the 
materiality. Finally, political risk is not only influencing the geographical allocation of 
upstream FDI through increased costs and higher discount rates. Investigating how 
kidnapping and crime affect companies, Pshisva and Suarez (2006: 23-28) argue that 
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companies also confront financial constraints when wanting to invest in host countries, in 
which the perceived degree of political risk is high. The reason for this is that banks and 
shareholders, in fear of ending up losing their invested money, may be more reluctant to make 
the necessary capital available to managers wanting to expand the business into new 
territories. From this, and the elements mentioned above, it should therefore be quite clear 
that political risk may seriously damages the financial viability of an investment project.      
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2 Theoretical framework 
In this chapter the theoretical framework, from which the hypotheses are derived, is 
presented. The chapter has two sections. In section one, FDI is first conceptualised before the 
motives and the determinants behind FDI are presented and debated in some detail. Finally, 
the risk mitigation capacity of multinational petroleum companies is debated, in which the 
focus is on how company size and state ownership may render some companies more likely to 
be able to handle political risk than others. Having debated FDI, section two begins with a 
definition and delimitation of political risk. From here the chapter proceeds with a 
presentation and discussion of the sources of political risk, in which the hypotheses are also 
presented. 
2.1 Foreign direct investments 
2.1.1 Definition and delimitations 
FDI can be described as a certain type of investment strategy, by which profit-maximising 
companies, that are expanding their businesses across national borders, are substituting 
market exchanges for long-term ownership control within the formal boundaries of the 
company. Separating FDI from other kinds of investment strategies, such as short-term 
portfolio investments, one of the key elements in the abovementioned definition is, that in 
order to be considered a FDI, companies must obtain some formal ownership (equity share) in 
a foreign investment project. According to OECD standards, this equity share is ten per cent 
(OECD 1999: 8). Although arbitrary and somewhat controversial, this goalpost will be the 
standard, by which FDI are separated from portfolio investments. This means that joint 
ventures, which have become ever more present in the petroleum industry, may be considered 
a FDI, if for any given company, their equity share in exploration and production projects 
exceeds ten per cent. Similarly, any foreign investor that establishes a foreign subsidiary, or 
otherwise is directly, or indirectly, holding equities in a foreign entity will be considered a 
foreign direct investor, given that the equity share exceeds the ten per cent limit. Finally, 
following common standards when defining upstream investments I include both exploration 
and production. Since exploration does not necessary mean that any formal equity is being 
obtained, the ten per cent rule may be violated in cases where upstream investments only take 
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the form of explorations. However, according to OECD standards, under certain 
circumstances, even transactions can be regarded as FDI. As it turns out, among these 
transactions are expenditures involved in exploration activities (ibid.: 22). 
2.1.2 Motives behind FDI 
According to Dunning and Lundan (2008: 67-74) there are basically four types of motives, or 
types of companies, which can explain the foreign activities of multinational companies. The 
first type of companies, are those that are motivated by need to acquire natural resources at a 
lower cost than in their home countries (ibid.: 68). Being further divided into three sub types, 
these natural resource seekers are assumed to either be seeking physical resources, skilled 
workers or technology, and knowledge. As these resources are unequally distributed between, 
and of unequal importance to multinational petroleum companies, there are good reasons to 
believe that they are all present as motivations for FDI within the international petroleum 
industry. The second type of companies, are those that are motivated by the access to foreign 
markets. While perhaps of secondary concern to companies preoccupied with upstream 
investments, market seekers are assumed to invest for such purposes as to circumvent import 
restrictions, adapt products to local markets and to improve their market position (ibid.: 70). 
The third type of motive that may encourage companies to go abroad is closely connected to 
the integration processes, as companies may find that the production chain can be more 
efficient if subsumed to common governance. Usually succeeding the other motivations in 
time, efficiency seekers are frequently found doing host country shopping and the persecution 
of scale economics. Finally, there are companies that are motivated by long-term strategic 
considerations. Aimed at improving competitiveness, these strategic asset seekers are trying 
to gain market control through measures like mergers, takeovers and alliance building (ibid.: 
72-73). Mostly proactive in nature, these strategies may, however, also be motivated by a 
wish to harm existing competitors and to prohibit the market entry of new competitors.  
2.1.3 Determinants of FDI: the eclectic OLI paradigm 
Dismantling the black box of the multinational company, Dunning’s eclectic OLI paradigm 
provides a comprehensive analytical framework, from which more specific inferences about 
the determinants of FDI may be derived. Building on theories, such as the product cycle 
theory of Vernon, Hymer’s industrial organisation theory, and the internalisation theories of 
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Buckley and Casson, the OLI paradigm identifies three types of advantages, or sub 
paradigms, which together, offer some suggestions about why, where and how multinational 
companies conduct their international business activity (Dunning and Lundan 2008).  
The first type of advantages, which are highlighted in the OLI framework, is O-specific 
advantages (O). As the name suggests, O-specific advantages refer to assets that a company 
possesses and which provide the company with a competitive advantage in competition with 
foreign and domestic companies. Following Dunning and Lundan (2008: 100-106), assets can 
be classified as being either tangible or intangible. While tangible are physical assets, such as 
machinery, capital, and, in the case of petroleum companies, reserves, intangible assets 
includes non-physical endowments such as non-replicable technology, an experienced 
management and reputation. O-specific advantages can, furthermore, be provided externally 
or they can be generated by the company itself (ibid.: 120). While examples of the former are 
state ownership and access to educated personnel, development of state of the art technology 
and a competent management are examples of O-specific advantages that originate from 
inside the boundaries of the company.     
Given the configuration of the O-specific and I-specific advantages, locational advantages (L) 
offer explanations for why some countries are regarded as more attractive destinations to FDI 
than others. Traditionally explained by the factors that determine a country’s comparative 
advantage, such as the presence and accessibility of natural resources, the size and closeness 
of markets, and opportunities to enhance operation efficiency, today, L-specific advantages 
are also considered to include political factors, such as government stability, corruption 
levels, and fiscal and regulatory regimes (Oatley 2008: 177). Since focusing on FDI in the 
petroleum industry, reserves that can be profitably exploited are also imperative sources of L-
specific advantages. This is, to some degree, a question of geology, with larger fields being 
preferred to smaller fields, and onshore fields being preferred to offshore fields. Furthermore, 
as upstream investments demand large amounts of intermediate goods, such as steel, stable 
and secure supply of these goods is usually deemed to be critical.  
The third and final type of advantage is that of internalisation advantages (I). Caused by the 
failure of markets to efficiently mitigate transactions between companies involved in the 
production chain, multinational petroleum companies may find, that instead of relying on 
market transactions when buying and selling intermediate goods, their O-specific advantages 
are better exploited by subsuming the whole, or parts of, the production chain under the 
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formal authority of the company (Dunning and Lundan 2008: 100). The process, which is 
often referred to as vertical integration, is of particular interest to scholars studying 
multinational companies, as transaction costs are typically higher in international markets, 
than in domestic markets (Oatley 2008: 181-182). With regard to the petroleum industry, I-
specific advantages are first and foremost a question about secure supply of crude oil and 
natural gas. By integrating upstream and downstream multinational petroleum companies are 
thus, to a certain degree, able to protect themselves against the frequently volatile prices that 
characterise the petroleum market. 
2.1.4 O-specific advantages and political risk mitigation 
Despite the importance and interdependency of the three types of advantages, as mentioned 
earlier, I consider O-specific advantages to be of primary importance when assessments about 
the risk mitigation capacity of multinational petroleum companies are made. Based in this, O-
specific advantages will be the main focus of the remaining discussion.  
Having presented the main tenets of the OLI framework, the next step is to identify O-specific 
advantages and thereafter to explain how these advantages can influence multinational 
petroleum companies’ willingness to be exposed to, and the ability to mitigate political risk. 
The first type of O-specific advantages to be considered here is company size. Although not 
an advantage, per se, and, at times, even risk enhancing, larger petroleum companies should 
have better risk mitigation capacity than their smaller counterparts due to the some of the 
following reasons: 
Access to capital and scale economics: Larger petroleum companies usually have more 
capital at disposal than smaller companies. First of all, as the magnitude of their operations 
may give rise to scale economics, larger companies tend to have higher returns. Furthermore, 
due to their geographical diversification, larger multinational petroleum companies can 
harvest from tax planning, with profits being reallocated to countries where taxation policies 
are most favourable (Osmundsen 2006b: 18). Large capital reserves also give the opportunity 
to sustain short-term losses without having to abandon production. Finally, as larger 
petroleum companies are usually objects to larger stakeholders than smaller petroleum 
companies, larger petroleum companies are likely to privilege from better access to political 
risk insurance (PRI), which although both expensive and with limited coverage, may prove a 
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valuable supplement to other risk handling strategies, such as diversification (Hamdani et al. 
2005).      
Political support: Due to their relatively larger stocks of employees and their ability to 
generate tax revenues, politicians may have stronger incentives to bail out or offer political 
support to larger companies than to their smaller counterparts (Knutsen et al 2011: 23). As 
these are important measures to enhance the leverage in bargains with host country 
governments, larger companies may thus be less in risk of becoming victims of predatory 
taxation and regulations that could considerably affect the expected future cash flows.  
Managerial skills and technical expertise: As many of the remaining reserves are rather 
difficult to exploit, having the necessary managerial and technical expertise is rapidly 
becoming a major source of leverage in bargains with host country governments. Being 
present around the globe, large petroleum companies have the opportunity to recruit managers 
and leading professionals with a wider range of backgrounds and with the necessary technical 
expertise and country insight (Osmundsen 2006b: 18). Furthermore, larger companies also 
have the ability sustain larger R&D departments, which is imperative in developing non-
replicable technology- an advantage, which again, may lead to increased bargain power in 
negotiations with host country governments. Finally, as aspiring leaders and professionals 
may see a position within a large multinational petroleum company as a step up the carrier 
ladder, larger petroleum companies may enjoy a competitive advantage in attracting the best 
and most experienced managers and professionals.  
Reputation: While size may not always enhance the reputation, larger companies should enjoy 
an advantage when compared to smaller competitors, as many of the largest companies have 
sustained long term relations with host country governments.
1
 Being blessed with a good 
name should, all things equal, enhance the risk mitigation capacity of multinational petroleum 
companies. A good reputation may affect the risk mitigation and exposure to political risk 
through two channels. First, a good reputation may be critical in negotiations with host 
country governments. Second, being equipped with a strong brand may also reduce the 
exposure to risks from societal groups, which may otherwise find installations and employees 
legitimate targets of acts of crime, such as sabotage and kidnapping.  
                                                 
1
 As larger companies often engage in larger operations, which may spark conflict with indigenous groups, larger 
petroleum companies may indeed become exposed to higher political risk. If politically salient enough, this 
could even lead governments to interfere, with the potential losses increasing considerably.   
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The second source of O-specific advantages, which is of particular relevance when analysing 
companies within the petroleum industry, is that of state ownership. By providing companies 
with privileged market positions in domestic markets, which may give rise to monopoly rents, 
and by making state capital available for investments purposes, state ownership can, indeed, 
contribute to the risk mitigation capacity of multinational petroleum companies, as measures 
to mitigate political risk are usually associated with considerable expenditures. Furthermore, 
as states are considered powerful stakeholders, equipped with political tools and connections 
seldom found among private shareholders, by bringing state interests to the table in 
“trilateral” negotiations over contracts and licensees, the company should, ceteris paribus, 
enhance its leverage vice versa host country governments (Knutsen et al. 2011: 10).   
Although the upside of state ownership seems unquestionable, having the state as owner or 
major shareholder is, however, not without drawbacks. As governments, hungering for 
revenues and political support, may have other objectives than those of the company 
management, approval of investment projects may become hostage of excessive bureaucratic 
processes, which, among other things, could render the company unable to exploit first mover 
advantages (Knutsen et al. 2011: 6). Underlining the ambiguous effect of state ownership, 
there are, furthermore, instances where companies are more or less functioning as the 
government’s personal bank account. By treating companies as their personal “milking 
cows”, governments may, however, leave their own companies unable to engage in 
potentially lucrative foreign ventures (UNCTAD 2007: 124). Obviously posing a threat 
against the companies’ risk mitigation capabilities, state ownership must therefore be 
considered a double-edged sword, which under certain circumstances, can be quite negative 
with respect to the companies’ ability to handle political risk. 
2.2 Political risk 
2.2.1 Definition and delimitations 
Being one of those concepts, of which a new definition is presented in every new book or 
article that is written about it, definitions of political risk frequently suffer from either being 
too vague or too restrictive. As I do not intend to make any revolutionary contributions to this 
debate here, I will approach the issue by using a rather well known definition of political risk. 
Defined by Robock and Simmonds (1989: 378) as “the likelihood that political forces will 
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cause drastic changes in a country’s business environment that affect the profit and other 
goals of a particular business enterprise”, political risk is assumed to include four necessary, 
though not sufficient, elements. First of all, political risk must represent some discontinuity 
(ibid.: 379). This means that regular changes, such as regular interest rate fluctuations and 
peaceful transition of incumbency do not represent political risk, as these are fairly 
predictable developments with minor impact on the business environment. Second, political 
risk must also be associated with some degree of uncertainty. If an event, or a policy 
implementation, were to be perfectly anticipated, companies would just adjust their strategies, 
thereby reducing political risk to nothing else than business as usual. Third, considering the 
sources of political risk, political forces are defined in rather general terms, not limiting 
political risk to government policies. This has obvious empirical implications in that events, 
such as terrorism and kidnappings, are also considered as elements of political risk. Finally, 
political risk must have a significant impact on the profit (cash flow) or other goals pursued 
by multinational petroleum companies (ibid.: 379). As I have argued earlier, companies are 
not similar in their capability of handling political risk and events and policies that effect one 
company’s profit, may not affect another. Political risk is thus considered a matter of 
exposure, and not as a deterministic precondition for the allocation of upstream FDI. 
A commonly debated issue related to political risk is that of risk versus uncertainty. Despite 
being frequently used interchangeably, risk can, according to Jakobsen (2007: 21), be 
separated from uncertainty in that risk is associated with a measurable likelihood of 
occurrence. Opposite, when confronted with uncertainty, it is impossible to calculate the exact 
probability of occurrence of any particular event. In reality, many of the situations facing 
foreign direct investors are thus a matter of uncertainty and not risk (ibid.: 21). Taking these 
considerations into account, my approach is therefore, that multinational petroleum 
companies are confronted with both political risk and political uncertainty when making 
investments abroad. For instance, as multinational petroleum companies engage in bargains 
with host country governments they may receive information that function as signals of 
government preferences, and eventually, their future actions. This does not mean that 
governments cannot surprise companies, which they have certainly done in the past. The point 
is that multinational petroleum companies, although to varying degree, do have knowledge 
that allow them to make more or less accurate inferences about the likelihood of unfavourable 
policies being implemented. On the other hand, getting credible information about the 
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capabilities and preferences of insurgencies and oppositional groups may prove more difficult 
and companies are thus confronted with real uncertainty. 
Perhaps the most important assumption in this thesis is that companies are unequally 
equipped to handle political risk and thus that companies are differing in their de facto risk 
exposure. Coinciding with this, political risk can, according to Robock and Simmonds (1989: 
380-382), be differentiated between macro and micro risk. While macro risk refers to 
unpredicted events or policies that affect all foreign companies in a fairly similar fashion, 
micro risk is industry or even company specific, and includes, among other things, taxation, 
sabotage, kidnappings and export restrictions. Prevalent and even, at times, subtle in nature, 
micro risk is generally perceived as being most demanding to handle since efforts to mitigate 
micro risk often fall on a limited number of companies. On the other hand, as macro risk 
includes large scale events, such as civil wars and nationalisations, the potential loss of profit 
from macro risk may be even greater if materialised.     
Closely related to political risk, but nevertheless different by definition, country risk is 
frequently used to denote the variety of risk factors confronting foreign investors abroad 
(Jakobsen 2007: 23). Although used interchangeably in the literature, it seems, however, to be 
a rather common assertion that country risk is a wider concept, which besides political risk, 
also includes economic factors like interest rates and inflation. While not disregarding the 
difference in scope, origin and effects, in this thesis the term political risk is used to describe 
both political and economic factors, such as inflation. This decision is based on the assertion 
that even economic factors have policy implications, which may, or may not lead 
governments and societal group to take actions against foreign investing petroleum 
companies. 
2.2.2 The risk generating process: sources, mechanisms and 
effects 
While the sources of political risk, i.e. “the major underlying political [and social] forces than 
can cause abrupt policy changes”, are the focus in the upcoming analyses, these are not 
sufficient causes, that by themselves can explain how and why multinational petroleum 
companies experience reduced or disrupted cash flows (Robock and Simmonds 1989: 382). 
Thus, to explain how multinational petroleum companies may end up with lost profits we 
need to move two steps further in the political risk generating process, considering both 
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political risk mechanisms and, finally, political risk effects. A model of the political risk 
generating process is depicted in figure 2.1.
  
Figure 2.1 The risk generating process 
(a = assets, cf = cash flow, cc = company costs) 
Connecting political risk sources to political risk effects, political risk mechanisms encompass 
the nature and scope of the relations that exist between the company and the actors executing 
actions against companies, most notably the government and civil society groups. To reach 
agreements about financial and legal aspects of an investment project, multinational 
petroleum companies and host country governments engage in negotiations, which according 
to Vernon (1971: 47), are characterised by a critical transition of bargain power after the 
company has conducted its initial investments. Denoted as sunk costs, due to their 
irretrievability, it is believed that the immobility of the production assets, which are typical to 
extractive industries, creates an incentive for host country governments to renege on 
previously signed contracts. Under such circumstances, being equipped with the necessary O-
specific advantages to secure some kind of leverage in negotiations with host country 
governments is therefore critical, as this may reduce the likelihood of becoming victims of 
expropriations or breach of contracts (BoC).
2
  
                                                 
2
 According to Grosse and Behrman (1992), the outcome of company-government negotiations is dependent on 
1) the relative resources of the negotiating parties, 2) the relative stakes of the actors involved, and 3) the 
similarity of interests between the company and the government. 
16 
 
As petroleum companies have grown more aware of the social and economic consequences of 
their operations, there has been an increased focus on strategies aimed at creating local 
content. Denoted as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), these strategies emphasise a 
broader thinking of company responsibility, which besides internal actors, such as employees 
and shareholders, also encompasses third parties, such as indigenous people and local 
communities. There is apparently much to gain from CSR. According to van Tulder and van 
der Zwart (2006: 200-220), succeeding with CSR strategies is decisive in building a good 
reputation, which can be considered as “an intangible resource that can create and sustain a 
competitive advantage and enhance the performance of companies”. Others, such as Kytle 
and Ruggie (2005) emphasise the ability of CSR to provide companies with strategically 
important information, which may be a valuable component in risk mitigation strategies.   
The final stage of the political risk generating process is political risk effects. These are the 
concrete actions and policies directed against a multinational petroleum company following 
either fruitless negotiations or unsuccessful CSR strategies. As can be seen in figure 2.1, 
political risk effects cover a wide range of policies and actions. Reaching from expropriations 
to kidnappings of employees and local managers, political risk effects may lead to lost assets 
(a) or disrupted cash flows (cf), while also increasing company costs (cc) (Robock and 
Simmonds 1989: 386). 
2.3 Sources of political risk and FDI 
2.3.1 Political regime 
An issue, which has received lots of attention in international political economy, is the 
relationship between political regime and allocation and magnitude of inward FDI (Li and 
Resnick 2003; Przeworski and Limongi 1993). However, so far the debate over whether 
democracy, or authoritarian rule, is most attractive to FDI has turned out inconclusive. 
Without going too much in depth, the arguments in favour of democracy are, that due to the 
peacefulness and transparency surrounding transitions of power, multinational companies 
prefer democracies to authoritarian states (Li and Resnick 2003: 185). Democracies are, 
furthermore, claimed to enhance the protection of property rights, while at the same time 
lowering the potential risk to the company’s reputation, as democracies are generally more 
respectful to human rights (ibid.: 185-188).  
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Contrary to the abovementioned theories, there are scholars who hold that democracies are 
not in any particular way more attractive to international capital than societies with more 
authoritarian traits (Przeworski and Limongi 1993: 52). There are at least two reasons why 
this may be the case. First, not responsible to the people, and motivated by short term 
revenues, in autocracies, governments or self-declared omnipotent dictators are perceived as 
more prone to embark on policies that are profitable to international capital, even at the 
expense of other desirable policy goals. Second, as the concentration of power tends to be 
greater under authoritarian rule, authoritarian leadership may also be more efficient, since the 
power of making decisions rests on a limited number of individuals. As a consequence of this, 
negotiations are thus being conducted directly with governments or dictators, thereby 
avoiding to get caught up by vast and rule-governed bureaucracies.  
While the abovementioned theories may all offering plausible explanations for why 
democracy or autocracy may be more attractive to foreign capital, for now it is assumed that 
the former type of considerations prevail. Following the assumptions which were made about 
the effect of company size, larger petroleum companies should therefore be more prone to 
invest in autocracies, due to their superior access to capital and political support, and their 
more experienced management. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H1a: Larger multinational petroleum companies are more likely than smaller multinational 
petroleum companies to be present with upstream FDI in countries with a lower degree of 
democracy. 
When analysing the relationship between political regime and the upstream investment 
patterns of multinational companies, many analyses deploy the same assumption as Knutsen 
et al. (2011: 12). According to these scholars, state owned companies should, due to political, 
and in democracies, public scrutiny, be less prone to invest in countries where basic 
democratic rights are violated. On the other hand, as a majority of the state owned petroleum 
companies themselves originate from countries where citizens are deprived of basic 
democratic rights, this may not be the case within the petroleum industry. Combined with 
better access to capital and political support, which should increase their ability to mitigate 
the risk accompanying authoritarian rule, in accordance with these arguments, I have 
therefore formulated the following hypothesis: 
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H1b: State owned multinational petroleum companies are more likely than private 
multinational petroleum companies to be present with upstream FDI in countries with a lower 
degree of democracy. 
2.3.2 Political instability and civil war 
Increasing uncertainty and encouraging opportunistic behaviour from governments and 
individuals, rapid and violent changes of political power are frequently considered an 
important source of political risk (Jakobsen 2006; Kobrin 1979). Usually referred to as 
political instability, events, such as coups and revolutions have the potential of severely 
lowering the materiality of an investment project. As information is frequently scarce and less 
reliable in times of rapid political change, transaction costs tend to climb. All things equal, 
this should lead multinational petroleum companies to increase their discount rates, making 
an investment project less competitive when compared to alternative allocations of scarce 
capital. Furthermore, if already present, as production facilities and employees may become 
caught in the crossfire in violent uprisings, political instability may lead to disrupted cash 
flows and force increased company costs upon multinational petroleum companies. Again, the 
result is reduced materiality, which would make the investment less attractive when compared 
with alternative allocations of capital. 
Of all the sources of political risk civil war is perhaps the most dramatic one with regard to 
the general investment climate. Civil war may harm the operations of multinational 
companies through, at least, three channels. First, through increased levels of violence, the 
role of the military becomes more important- often at the expense of law enforcement 
institutions, such as the police and the court system. Leading to increased enforcement costs, 
property rights thus tend to suffer (Collier 1999a: 169). Second, with elevated levels of 
violence, the threat of assaults being committed against vital physical production 
infrastructure becomes imminent. These kinds of threats should be of particular importance to 
petroleum companies, as FDI within the petroleum industry usually entail investments in 
large and immobile production facilities. Third and finally, since individuals, who live in 
countries that are plagued by civil conflict, discount the future more heavily, opportunism 
tends to rise (Collier 1999b: 9). As individuals with shorter time frames are less concerned 
about the future, multinational petroleum companies may therefore experience a higher risk of 
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becoming victims of criminal assaults in the form of terrorism, kidnappings and theft, which 
would obviously lead to higher security and insurance costs.  
Debating how political instability and civil war may influence the allocation of upstream FDI 
of multinational petroleum companies, the role of state ownership should be quite similar to 
that assumed when debating the relationship between political regime and upstream 
investment patterns. As both political instability and civil war tend to be negatively affecting 
property rights, while at the same time, raising transaction costs and levels of crime, being 
able to draw on state capital and political connections is an advantage. Moving on the effect 
of company size, larger companies again seem to have an advantage, with better access to 
capital, and superior managerial skills representing important preconditions for managing 
high-tension situations, such as coups and civil wars. On the other hand, being large may also 
spark unwanted attention, with more installations leading to higher risk exposure. For now it 
is, however, assumed that the former considerations dominate the latter. Hence: 
H2a: Larger multinational petroleum companies are more likely than smaller multinational 
petroleum companies to be present with upstream FDI in countries with a higher degree of 
political instability and likelihood of civil war. 
H2b: State owned multinational petroleum companies are more likely than private 
multinational petroleum companies to be present with upstream FDI in countries with a 
higher degree of political instability and likelihood of civil war. 
2.3.3 Poverty and underdevelopment 
While some of the countries under consideration have made remarkable progress, poverty and 
underdevelopment is still a pronounced feature of many of the countries that host 
multinational petroleum companies. Following Raj (1998: 268-289), one of the most 
important explanations why poverty has gained such a strong foothold in many of the 
countries considered here, is that the poor are excluded from credit markets, due to their 
inability to provide the necessary collateral. Furthermore, as the poor are struggling to keep 
up their daily energy balance, they are also less attractive to hire, since production in the 
labour-intensive industries, most frequently found in non-OECD countries, is highly 
dependent on the physical state of labour (ibid.: 272-273). Unemployment thus tends to be 
high in countries, struggling with a high share of poor people. If combined with a population 
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with a high proportion of young men, this has proved to be highly conflict enhancing (Collier 
et al. 2009: 24). 
The effect of poverty on the investment climate is neither obvious nor undisputed. It does 
appear, however, that poverty increases the propensity to take part in economically motivated  
criminal activity, as the rewards from criminal activities, such as kidnappings, sabotage and 
terrorism, need to be lower in countries, in which a substantial amount of individuals are 
being marginalised by poverty (Briggs 2001: 9-25). Poverty may also encourage criminal 
behaviour in yet another profound way. Provided that countries with a higher degree of 
poverty tend to have weaker law enforcing capabilities, the expected risk and opportunity cost 
of crime declines. If one accepts that individuals and groups are generally motivated by 
rational and utility-maximising objectives, poverty and underdevelopment thus seems to 
create conditions, encouraging criminal behaviour and social unrest.  
To be able to effectively handle the risks stemming from marginalised individuals and 
societal groups, multinational petroleum companies must have the ability to both protect and 
insure themselves against damage on physical production facilities and assaults against 
employees. Again, as security measures, such as the hiring of safety services, political risk 
insurance and CSR strategies may be rather expensive, larger companies with more capital at 
disposal and with superior managerial skills, should be better prepared to handle these kinds 
of risks than their smaller competitors. Therefore: 
H3a: Larger multinational petroleum companies are more likely than smaller multinational 
petroleum companies to be present with upstream FDI in countries with a lower degree of 
human development and a higher degree of poverty. 
For the same reasons why state owned companies may refrain from entering host countries 
with undemocratic political regimes, investing in countries with lower human development 
may be more troublesome for state owned companies, as politicians and the public may 
demand these companies to take comprehensive measures to improve the standard of living of 
affected societal groups. Again, however, as state owned companies may take advantage of 
having access to state capital, they may at the end decide that the costs of embarking on risk 
mitigation strategies, such as CSR, are acceptable in light of the potential profit from 
engagement in risky foreign ventures. Taking both arguments into consideration, I will 
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assume that the latter type of considerations prevails. I have therefore formulated the 
following hypothesis:      
H3b: State owned multinational petroleum companies are more likely than private 
multinational petroleum companies to be present with upstream FDI in countries with a lower 
degree of human development and a higher degree of poverty. 
2.3.4 Regulatory quality  
Caused by the strategic and economic importance of oil and gas, host country governments 
have every incentive to keep national petroleum markets under tight regulatory control and to 
cooperate with the domestic petroleum industry to improve productivity and competitiveness. 
In doing this, they may, however, inflict extra costs on multinational petroleum companies, as 
regulations are usually constructed to prohibit foreign companies from taking part in certain 
activities, while at the same time, require them to engage in others (Oatley 2008: 192). 
Furthermore, in their efforts to extract as many benefits as possible from having large deposits 
of oil and gas, and to protect the domestic industry, host country governments may find it 
necessary to induce high taxes and to increase royalties, which if severe and unexpected, can 
considerably reduce the profitability. Often referred to as rent seeking, this means that 
governments are actively trying to get a share of the excess profit from revenues above the 
market price (ibid.: 142). Finally, there are policies that are motivated by what might be called 
economic nationalism (Jakobsen 2007: 74-76). Creating the impression that the operations of 
multinational petroleum companies are the root causes of economic underdevelopment, 
governments may legitimise policies, which could lead to contracts being profoundly altered 
or terminated all together. Although not necessary equal to expropriation with regard to 
severity, having contracts broken, or altered, do represent major concerns to foreign investors, 
as profits may be reduced, while simultaneously increasing uncertainty about future revenues 
and frame conditions. All things equal, this should also lead to higher materiality demands, as 
discount rates need to be heightened to take into account the uncertainty of future returns. 
Based on the arguments which were mentioned above I find it reasonable to assume that both 
larger companies, and companies with a higher share of state ownership, are less in danger of 
becoming victims of predatory regulation and taxation. The explanation is that these 
companies have more resources at disposal, and through that, more leverage in negotiations 
with host country governments. The negotiation power is further increased by the relatively 
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higher stakes that are in play for influential stakeholders, such as states, banks and pension 
funds. Based on this I have formulated the following hypotheses: 
H4a: Larger multinational petroleum companies are more likely than smaller multinational 
petroleum companies to be present with upstream FDI in countries with a lower degree of 
regulatory quality 
H4b: State owned multinational petroleum companies are more likely than private 
multinational petroleum companies to be present with upstream FDI in countries with a lower 
degree of regulatory quality. 
2.3.5 Corruption  
Despite being criminalised by the 1997 OECD Convention on Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions, corruption is still a prominent feature of 
many of the resource rich countries included in this analysis (Smarzynska and Wei 2000: 1). 
The World Bank has defined corruption as “the abuse of public power for private benefit” and 
it is often assumed that corruption is a symptom of weak institutions, lack of transparency in 
public processes and powerful public officials (Tanzi 1998: 564). As a source of political risk, 
the effects of corruption on the location of FDI are, however, ambiguous (Lambsdorff 2003: 
231). On one side there are scholars, who claim that corruption may indeed create 
opportunities for foreign investors. Following the arguments of Lien (1986: 337-341), if one 
assumes that foreign companies are generally more efficient than their domestic competitors, 
corruption may indeed favour multinational petroleum companies, as multinational petroleum 
companies with higher efficiency, also have more money available to bribery. Corruption can, 
furthermore, compensate for low wages paid to state bureaucrats. Thus, governments may not 
need to impose heavy tax burdens on foreign capital (Tullock 1996: 6-19). As such, 
corruption may actually represent an L-specific advantage, as countries with higher levels of 
corruption could be seen as “softer targets”.    
While perfectly reasonable, the arguments, which were presented above, are opposed by 
scholars who claim that corruption distorts markets and the allocation of resources. One way, 
through which corruptive practices may generate political risk, is that it may lead to a race to 
the top, in which government officials and bureaucrats are pursuing rent seeking strategies 
(Mauro 1997: 87). As mentioned earlier, rent seeking behaviour harms profit in a rather direct 
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manner, as it leads to declining differences between operation cost and market price. The 
second reason why corruption discourages FDI is that corruption separates formal and 
informal power, leading to higher transactions costs (Smarzynska and Wei 2001: 2). While 
also harmful to the domestic business community, there are good reasons to believe that 
foreign companies, due to their relatively weaker links with the government and state 
officials, are affected more severely than their domestic counterparts. Finally, if multinational 
petroleum companies are being unveiled as corrupt, they may face harsh reactions from 
shareholders, business partners and customers. Although difficult to measure in terms of 
profit losses, it seems reasonable to assume that having their reputation dragged through the 
mud by negative publicity, could pose a major threat to future income and goodwill.  
Although illegal, as mentioned above, larger companies with more capital at disposal should, 
all things being equal, enjoy competitive advantages in bribery games. Furthermore, being 
privileged with better access to state officials, an important channel to be awarded with 
licenses and concessions, larger companies should be less restrained from making investments 
in countries with a high degree of perceived corruption. Based on these assumptions I have 
therefore formulated the following hypotheses: 
H5a: Larger multinational petroleum companies are more likely than smaller multinational 
petroleum companies to be present with upstream FDI in countries with a higher degree of 
corruption.  
Caused by pressure from governments, which, in democracies, may be in fear of getting 
politically punished by voters for illegal business conduct abroad, state owned companies 
should be less frequently found investing in corrupt economies. On the other hand, and 
analogue to the case of democracy, as there are an increasing number of multinational 
petroleum companies that originate from countries, in which corruptive political practices are 
a prominent feature, the usual arguments may not hold in the case of multinationals within the 
petroleum industry. Accordingly,  
H5b: State owned multinational petroleum companies are more likely than private 
multinational petroleum companies to be present with upstream FDI in countries with a 
higher degree of corruption. 
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3 Data and research design 
In this chapter I will discuss some methodological issues concerning the formal analysis. 
Beginning with a section, in which I shortly discuss the consequences of selecting cases based 
on a non-probability mechanism, the chapter proceeds to the next subsection, where I 
elaborate on the reliability and validity of the data material. Here, the focus is on some the 
most common lines of criticism, which have been directed against the indicators that 
constitute the empirical foundation of the analysis. Following this, there will be a presentation 
of the indicators chosen as operationalisations of the theoretical concepts presented in the 
previous chapter. Finally, before moving on to the analysis itself, I will say a couple of words 
about the logistic multilevel model. In this subsection I will concentrate on how binary 
outcomes are analysed with logistic regression and how multilevel modelling enables us to 
handle structured data. A discussion about the consequences of including cross-level 
interaction terms, and a few words about causation, concludes the chapter. 
3.1 Case selection 
When determining what to observe there are, according to King et al. (1994:115-149), some 
important principles that should guide the selection of observations. Although not treated in 
great detail here, there are good reasons why scholars should try to adhere to such principles. 
First of all, if researchers aspire to make more general claims, observations should, as far as 
possible, be selected using random selection mechanisms. By avoiding selection bias, random 
selection creates representative samples, which is a necessary condition for making 
generalisations from sample to universe (Hellevik 2003: 114-115). To answer the research 
question I have collected a sample that consists of 26 of the 50 largest multinational 
petroleum companies, as ranked by Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (PIW 2010).
3
 The reason 
why only 26 companies are selected is a rather simple one. Of the 50 companies, for which 
there exist publicly available data, only 26 can be classified as multinational if this is 
requiring that they are operating in at least two or more foreign countries.
4
 Furthermore, as 
the top 50 ranking does not cover companies from the service sector, service companies, such 
                                                 
3
 The 26 selected companies are not the largest 26 companies, as large companies, such as Saudi Aramco and 
PDVSA, and smaller companies, such as Devon Energy and Ecopetrol, are all excluded due to their “non-
multinationality”. 
4
 This is the result of checking all the companies´ homepages and annual and operating reports. 
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as Halliburton and Transocean, are not included in the analysis, although they are very much 
indeed engaged in upstream activities.     
Similar to the selection of companies, the sample of host countries, which consists of 50 of 
the non-OECD countries endowed with oil and or gas reserves, is selected based on there 
being available and coherent data about their proved oil and gas reserves.
5,6
 Resulting in a 
sample of 1300 pairwise dyads, these observations are clearly selected based on intention and 
not by randomness. Selection bias may therefore become a problem with lower external 
validity as the result. On the other hand, as there are aspects with the sample that may render 
random selection less relevant or even inferior to non-probability selection rules, I will argue 
that the absence of random selection, in this case, does not pose such a serious threat against 
the possibility of making more general claims about how political risk affects the allocation of 
upstream FDI for other multinational petroleum companies than those included here.   
Certainly strengthening the external validity of most scientific inquiries, random selection 
also has its limitations. As illustrated by King et al. (1994: 125-126), when analysing a small 
sample, random selection could, in fact, prove a worse selection mechanism than non-random 
selection rules. The problem with random selection in these situations is that the researcher 
may end up eliminating focal observations from the analysis. For example, in a study of 
revolutions, most researchers would agree that missing out on the French or the American 
revolution would seriously hamper the potential of making more general claims about the 
nature and consequences of revolutions (ibid.: 125). In a similar fashion, as there are only a 
limited number of multinational petroleum companies and countries with substantial reserves 
of oil and gas, including these in the sample based on some random selection rule would have 
been accompanied with the risk of eliminating important companies such as ExxonMobil, 
Shell and Total, and major exporting countries like Saudi Arabia, Russia and Nigeria. Not 
only making the findings less relevant and interesting, it goes without saying that eliminating 
these observations from the analysis would raise questions about the external validity of the 
findings.  
A second aspect of the selection procedure, which should be taken into account when 
debating selection rules and their effect on the external validity, is the fact that the selected 
                                                 
5
 Although a member of the OECD, Mexico is included in the sample. This is due to its considerable reserves 
and because it is the only country from Central America for which I have found consistent and reliable data. 
6
 For a detailed overview of the companies and countries included in the sample, see appendix A. 
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sample does include a substantial part of the population.
7
 In situations like this, where the 
sample distribution and the population distribution share a high degree of similarity, 
traditional estimation becomes less effective since most calculations of standard errors are 
estimated based on the assumption of infinite populations. With regard to this analysis, the 
size of the population may be fairly accurately identified, which means that standard errors 
will tend to be overestimated if not corrected for the fact that the sample covers a larger part 
of the population than the usual 5% to 10%, under which samples are considered to be drawn 
for an infinite population.
8
 As the formal procedures of correcting for finite populations are 
outside the scope of this thesis, I will, according to common practice, ignore this for now. As 
a consequence, however, it will be more difficult to prove statistical significance in the 
subsequent analyses. 
Operating with an intentionally selected sample, to avoid selection bias, it is critical that the 
selection rule does not correlate with values on the dependent variable, as this should be 
allowed to vary (King et al. 1994: 129-130). Analysing dyads between countries and 
companies, the dependent variable is free to vary, as dyads with negative outcome (not 
present) are also included in the analysis. Correlation between the selection rule and values on 
the dependent variable should therefore not cause selection bias. If neither randomly selected 
nor based on values on the dependent variable, the selection of observations must thus be 
dependent on values on some of the independent variables. As mentioned above, host 
countries are selected based on there being available information about their reserves of 
proved oil and gas. Choosing observations based on their values on one of the control 
variables should, however, not create selection bias, “as the selection procedure does not 
predetermine the outcome of our study” (ibid.: 137). The problem of selection bias may, on 
the other hand, become a problem in the selection of multinational petroleum companies. 
While including companies of different size, the sample does, for reasons mentioned earlier, 
not include the smallest multinational petroleum companies. Obviously leading to some 
selection bias being introduced into the analyses, the inability to include observations of the 
smallest companies should thus result in some caution being executed, as far as 
generalisations are concerned. 
                                                 
7
 For coverage statistics, see appendix B. 
8
 One way to adjust standard errors when estimating from samples of finite populations is to use the finite 
population correction factor (FPC). If samples are close to populations the FPC falls towards 0, while it 
approaches 1 if samples are small relative to populations (Thompson 1992: 15). 
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3.2 Data 
Due to restricted access to most of the datasets that explicitly deal with political risk and 
multinational companies, I have been forced to construct my own dataset in order to address 
the research question. Deriving data from several well known sources, such as United Nations 
Development Program (2007), the World Bank (2007a; 2007b) Freedom House (2007) and 
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (2010), the new dataset consists of indicators that are mainly 
available on the internet. To take into account the effect of lead times, which is the period 
between preliminary analyses and the initiation of exploration and production, the variables 
used as measurements of political risk are operationalised using data from 2007. Despite 
rather arbitrary, by lagging these variables with three years, while simultaneously basing the 
dependent variable on data from 2010, I have introduced a built-in delay between the country-
specific explanatory variables and the effect variable. The purpose of this is to 1) take into 
account that multinational petroleum companies may have based their current presence in a 
particular host country on information that dates back in time and 2) to take into account that 
the process, in which political risk sources are transformed into political risk effects, may take 
some time.
9
   
Although the selection of publicly available data does improve the possibility of replicating 
the analysis, and that the lagging of the independent variables may contribute to increased 
realism, there are still some methodological issues, which need to be addressed before the 
variables are entered into the analysis. In the rest of this section I will therefore briefly discuss 
some of the most important methodological challenges and limitations of the upcoming 
analyses.   
Most of the indicators applied in this analysis are composite indexes that rely on a wide range 
of primary sources to operationalise the underlying components of the indexes. Being mainly 
derived from expert reports, surveys and agency reports, the indexes thus introduce an 
element of subjectivity into the analysis, as they are almost exclusively derived from 
perceptions data. Generally, perceptions data, such as surveys and expert reports is assumed 
to have some rather negative consequences for the measurement and external validity because 
subjective assessments may frequently not meet demands for stability and consistency across 
                                                 
9
 In many of the cases, the presence of multinational petroleum companies has, of course, lasted longer than the 
suggested delay. It is, however, not available and coherent data that goes back to the time of the earliest foreign 
investment projects. Furthermore, lead times may, for particular projects, be considerably longer than three 
years.   
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time, cultures and observers (Bryman 2004: 70-72; Van De Vijver 2003: 143-156). 
Furthermore, unless reported in a manner that allows for systematic and rigorous scrutiny, 
perceptions data are inclined to suffer from low replicability, due to difficulties in duplicating 
the responses in subsequent studies. On the other hand, as perceptions are among the most 
important determinants of behaviour, such as entering a foreign country, using perceptions 
data may, in fact, increase the realism of the analysis by taking into account that company 
officials and consultants alike, usually adhere to their own or others’ perceptions when 
making decisions about where to locate their investments.      
A second line of criticism, which has been directed against the types of indexes mostly 
deployed in this analysis, claims that gathering information from a substantial number of sub 
components into one composite index may come at the expense of loosing valuable 
information. If severe enough, the loss of information could harm the measurement validity, 
as the final index may represent a too rigid measurement of sub components that, in reality, 
have very unequal effects on the outcome. Incorporating information on all the indexes’ sub 
components into the analyses would, however, be a futile strategy, as this would only lower 
the simplicity of model, while at the same time, as it would increase the likelihood of being 
confronted with other methodological problems, such as multicollinearity and 
indeterminacy.
10
 I thus have to live with the knowledge that my indicators do not represent 
perfect operationalisations of the underlying “systematized concepts” and that some 
information and precision is lost in the process of compiling sub components into the final 
indexes (Adcock and Collier 2001: 4-6).   
The third line of criticism claims that the uncertainty that surrounds the index estimates is 
insufficiently communicated. This is a serious accusation with important implications for the 
analytical usefulness of these indexes, since the indexes may end up emphasising differences 
where there is actually a high degree of similarity (Høyland et al. 2010: 2). Studying two of 
the indexes, which are used in this analysis: the Freedom House Index and the Human 
Development Index, Høyland et al. (2010: 11-19) find that both these indexes are associated 
with considerable uncertainty, but also that they are able to distinguish some countries from 
each other. While the Freedom House Index does have problems separating countries that are 
located on the very top of the scale, the index is fairly able to distinguish countries located 
further down on the list. The same goes for the Human Development Index, which, according 
                                                 
10
 For a more thorough explanations of these problems, see King et al. (1994: 118-124). 
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to Høyland et al. (2010: 16), is quite successful in distinguishing between the world’s 100 
least developed countries.  
Being one of the few indexes that explicitly presents uncertainty estimates, for the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, the uncertainty about the index estimates is reported through error 
margins (World Bank 2007a). For example, debating the possibility of making cross country 
comparisons the scholars responsible for the WGI project show that with a 90% confidence 
level, for the Control of Corruption Index (CCI), error margins do not overlap in 63% of the 
pair-wise cross country comparisons (Kaufmann et al. 2010a: 12). If the confidence level is 
lowered to 75%, the proportion of statistically significant cross-country difference increases 
to 73% (ibid.: 12). All together then, it seems that the indicators chosen in this analysis, do 
allow for some cross-country comparison to be made. However, as there are still some 
considerable numbers of countries that cannot be distinguished from each other, it may 
become difficult to prove significant effects.  
Collecting data usually entails that some data is missing. If systematic and severe enough, 
missing data can introduce bias in the data material, which among other things, would lead to 
lower external validity. According to Gelman and Hill (2007: 530), the most benign form of 
missing data is what is usually denoted as missing completely at random (MCAR). In these 
situations, the probability of experiencing missing values is equally distributed across all 
observations and the “missingness” does not correlate with any observed or unobserved 
dependent values (Hedeker and Gibbons 2006: 281). On the other hand of scale, there are 
missing values, which are not random (MNAR). Here, the missingness can be attributed to 
some value of either the dependent or independent variables. With regard to this analysis, 
MNAR could be a potential problem, as missing values may depend of the value of some 
other independent variable. For example, in countries haunted with civil war or authoritarian 
rule, access to reliable information is usually more limited. There is, unfortunately, no quick 
fix of the problem of missing values. Using STATA, observations with missing data are, by 
default, excluded from the analysis through listwise deletion.
11
 While perhaps of particular 
severity in multilevel modelling, due the relatively smaller effective sample size, in this 
thesis, 52 out of 1300 observations are excluded. As I cannot rule out that some of these 
observations may be MNAR, from this then, it seems that some bias is inevitable.  
                                                 
11
 All observations with missing value on at least one variable are excluded from the analyses. 
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Although the application of multilevel modelling allows us to take into account dependency 
between observations, there may still be some dependency that is not controlled for. A certain 
type of dependency, which is of particular importance in this thesis, is that of spatial 
autocorrelation. Referring to a situation where the closeness between two observations may 
produce dependence in the predicted values on a variable, despite their potentially negative 
effect on the validity of the upcoming analyses, conducting formal analyses to detect and 
mitigate spatial dependency is outside the scope of this thesis (Thompson 1992: 238). In an 
attempt to control for regional effects, in conducting robustness tests in chapter four, 
observations from five regions are, in turn, removed from the sample. 
3.3 Operationalisations 
Given the ultimately qualitative nature of political risk, to secure satisfactory measurement 
validity, the theoretical concepts, which were put forward in the previous chapter, must be 
accurately measured.
12
 In this section I will therefore present and discuss the indicators, 
which have been selected as operationalisations of the theoretical concepts presented in the 
previous chapter. The section begins with a presentation of the dependent variable, where I 
will discuss the potential validation costs of operationalising FDI allocations by using a 
binary variable. Having presented and debated the dependent variable, I move on to the 
presentation of the indicators that measure O-specific advantages and sources of political risk. 
Finally the control variables are presented.
13
 
3.3.1 Dependent variable: presence of upstream FDI 
Caused by the inaccessibility of detailed and comparable data about upstream investment 
projects, this thesis applies a binary dependent variable, with the values being “present” and 
“not present/absent”. According to common practice of coding binary variables, if a 
multinational petroleum company is present with one investment project exceeding the 10% 
rule in a particular host country, it will be assigned the value 1. If, on the other hand, not 
operating within a county at all, or if the equity share in all investment projects in the country 
is below 10%, I will register the company as  “not present”, thereby coding it 0. 
                                                 
12
 For more on measurement validity, see Adcock and Collier (2001). 
13
 Descriptive statistics are depicted in appendix C.   
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Due to the lack of an industrial overview, in the process of gathering information about 
foreign upstream investment projects, I have used annual reports and official webpages 
released and published from the companies that are included in the analysis. As these 
companies differ quite substantially in their report of investment activities there are some 
concerns regarding the validity of the data.
14
 First, as the available annual reports are not all 
from 2010, nor either from the same years, some companies may have initiated or terminated 
upstream activities that are not registered in this analysis. This would obviously influence the 
final results, as this would lead to an inaccurate number of cases being assigned with a 
positive outcome. Second, due to differences in practice and national corporate legislation, 
not all companies report the equity share of all their foreign investments. As mentioned 
above, to be recorded as a foreign direct investment, this share must exceed 10%. Despite the 
uncertainty that surrounds some of the upstream projects considered here, I have chosen to 
include these observations in the analysis. This decision is based on the fact that a large 
majority of investments within the upstream segment are exceeding the 10% limit, thus 
making it quite likely that even those, for which I do not have the information, are falling into 
the FDI category. 
Using a binary variable, where the value “present” is dependent on only one observation 
passing the rule of inclusion, obviously has consequences with regard to the measurement 
validity of the indicator and the inferences that can be derived from the analysis. First, while 
defined as any investment exceeding a 10% equity share, foreign direct investments are, with 
regard to political risk exposure, not a homogenous group of investment strategies. Besides 
the fact that petroleum companies with, on average, a larger portion of equity (thereby with 
more to lose) are treated in the same manner as companies with less equity at stake, the nature 
of the FDI may also vary considerably between different host countries and companies.
15
 In 
some countries multinational petroleum companies are engaged in joint ventures with national 
petroleum companies. Potentially reducing the risk exposure through the creation of shared 
interests between host country governments and companies, these investment strategies are 
clearly distinguishable from strategies involving independent subsidiaries operating without 
the protection provided by formal contracts with domestic business. Second, as upstream FDI 
may entail operations in multiple fields within the same country, coding companies with only 
                                                 
14
 Private companies from industrialised countries, such as Shell, BP and Statoil, seem to be more thorough in 
their report of foreign operations than state-owned companies from non-OECD countries.   
15
 FDI may entail equity shares in multiple basins and fields, with companies having different equity shares 
across fields. 
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one project exceeding the 10% rule as present can lead to inaccurate inferences about the real 
exposure to political risk. The reason is that government induced risk in general, and socially 
induced risk in particular, may be unequally distributed within the same host country. Hence, 
by coding a company as present based on only one observation, there is a danger of 
underestimating the real level of political risk exposure. 
3.3.2 Dependent variables 
Company size 
Published annually by Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (PIW 2010) the Top 50 Petroleum 
Companies ranking, and the more extensive Top 100 Petroleum Companies, have become 
some of the most frequently cited sources when assessments and comparisons about the size 
of the world’s largest petroleum companies are made. Due to restricted access to the Top 100 
ranking, the scores on the publicly available Top 50 are used a proxy of size-related O-
specific advantages. Ranking petroleum companies according to their 1) reserves and 
production of liquids and gas, 2) products sales and distillation capacity, 3) revenues, 4) net 
income, 5) total assets, and 6) number of employees, the PIW index represents the unweighed 
sum of the sub-rankings on the abovementioned areas, where lower values are assigned to 
larger companies. In the September 2010 ranking the lowest value was assigned to 
ExxonMobil (PIW =37), while the smallest company to get into the sample was the Chinese 
company CNOOC (PIW= 315).  
Encompassing many of the principle factors that should be decisive in determining a 
company’s O-specific advantages, the PIW index is considered to be the best available 
alternative to operationalise company size. However, although covering some of the most 
important features that are assumed to influence the state and nature of the O-specific 
advantages, the PIW index does not provide direct information about intangible assets, such 
as knowledge, technology and managerial skills. As intangible assets are important elements 
in the theoretical definition of O-specific advantages, using an indicator, which only measures 
tangible assets, may lead to a reduction of the measurement validity. Despite these potentially 
shortcomings, however, as the endowment of intangible assets to a certain degree depends on 
there being some financial volume and operational experience, using a proxy that 
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encompasses data on both assets, reserves, revenues and income, should serve the purpose of 
identifying likely differences in intangible assets as well.  
Besides being unable to measure intangible assets, the properties of the PIW index also raise 
some methodological concerns, with the level of measurement being the most prominent one. 
As the distances between the values are rather unevenly distributed, treating the index as an 
interval scaled variable becomes somewhat more problematic than if the values were 
following an even distribution. Though it would be possible to remedy the problem of level of 
measurement by creating n-1 dummy variables, this would make the interpretation process 
rather comprehensive. Furthermore, as the variable is included in interaction terms, the 
product term will suffer from being rather difficult to interpret given the ordinal scaling. 
Based on this I have therefore generated a new variable, PIW2, which separates multinational 
petroleum companies with PIW values exceeding 90 from those companies, of which the PIW 
scores are equal or below 90. The rational behind this threshold is that the companies with 
PIW scores of 90 or below must all be considered as “super majors” in today’s petroleum 
industry.
16
 Including all of the remaining four members of what were once the Seven Sisters 
(ExxonMobil, Shell, BP and Chevron), US integrated ConocoPhillips, China’s CNPC, and 
Europe’s largest integrated company, Total, I suspect the size related O-specific advantages to 
be largest for these companies, given their relatively longer operating history and larger 
network of stakeholders. 
State ownership 
Following the theories, which were highlighted in Knutsen et al. (2011), investment patterns 
of state owned companies are expected to differ from their private competitors. To find 
information about the degree of state ownership, I again turned to Petroleum Intelligence 
Weekly (PIW 2010), which simultaneously with ranking the 50 largest petroleum companies 
also presents an overview of the percentage of the stocks that are owned by the state. 
Although highly accurate inferences about the effect of state ownership may be derived from 
the original PIW ownership overview, there is research that gives us reasons to believe that 
the strategic importance of state ownership is dependent on certain thresholds being exceeded 
(Knutsen et al. 2011: 16). Despite a matter of home country legislation, holding a majority of 
                                                 
16
 The phrase “super majors” is usually applied on the remaining members of the Seven Sisters, which through 
their membership in the Consortium of Iran dominated the international petroleum industry from 1940 to 1970. 
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the shares usually means more influence when important decisions, such as the entry into a 
foreign country, are made. Based on these assumptions, I have therefore recoded the original 
variable into a new ownership indicator, separating companies with state shareholding 
exceeding 50% from those where the state owns less than 50%. The variable, with the name 
S_OWNSHIP2, will be assigned the value 0, if the state owns less than the half of the equity 
share and 1 if the government’s share of the stocks exceeds 50%. For simplicity, the former 
will be denoted as private companies and the latter as state owned companies. 
Political regime 
As highlighted in the theoretical discussion about the effect of democracy on inward FDI, it 
appears to be no consensus over whether or not multinational companies prefer democracy to 
authoritarian rule. To analyse how this relationship is materialising within the petroleum 
industry, I will use Freedom House (Freedom House 2007) and their Freedom in the World 
Index (FHI) to measure the effect of host countries regime. Ranking countries and territories 
based on their perceived respect of political and civil rights, countries are given scores on a 
0.5 per interval scale reaching from 1 to 7. While countries receiving scores from 1 to 2.5 are 
perceived as being “free”, countries and territories falling below this threshold are either 
being classified as “partly free” (3.0 to 5.0) or “not free” (5.5 to 7.0) (ibid.: 2007). In order to 
get more intuitive results when measuring the effect of political regime, the indicator is 
reversed with higher values being assigned to more democratic countries. 
Political instability and civil war 
By increasing transaction costs, and through the elevation of levels of crime and violence, 
political instability and civil conflicts are assumed to encourage governments and civil society 
groups to initiate actions that could harm profit. As a proxy of the likelihood that 
multinational petroleum companies will experience reductions or terminations of cash flows 
caused by rapid and violent political change or events, I will use the Political Stability Index 
(PSI) from the WGI (World Bank 2007a), which is “capturing perceptions of the likelihood 
that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including politically‐motivated violence and terrorism” (Kaufmann et al. 2010b: 4). The 
variable has a minimum value of -2.5 and a maximum value of 2.5.  
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Poverty and underdevelopment 
In accordance with theories suggesting that the alternative costs of crime and civil unrest 
decline with lower standards of living, an indicator, measuring human development is 
included in the analysis. Being one of the most frequently used measures of socioeconomic 
development, this analysis applies the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) from 
2007 as a proxy of the propensity of marginalised people to engage in criminal actions, 
targeting installations and personnel of multinational petroleum companies.
17
 The 2007 HDI 
consists of three subcomponents. First, the prospect of living a long and healthy life is 
measured using data on life expectancy at birth. Since the life expectancy may not be equal to 
zero, a value of 25 years is applied as minimum value. Obviously arbitrary in nature, the 
minimum goalpost is assumed to be the lowest life expectancy that, in theory, can secure a 
society’s survival over time (UNDP 2007: 355-356). Moving to the other side of the scale, the 
maximum value is derived using the highest observed life expectancy to date. As of 2007 this 
was 85 years (ibid.: 355-356). 
The second dimension of the HDI is access to knowledge. Composed of two sub-indices 
measuring 1) the adult literacy rate and 2) gross enrolment ratio, these sub-indices are merged 
into one composite measure by adding the two indices together with 2/3 weight being put on 
literacy rates and 1/3 on gross enrolment rates. For the composite measure, the minimum 
value is assigned the value of zero, while the maximum goalpost corresponds to a value of 
0.99. Third, to measure the decency of life, the HDI index uses the gross domestic product per 
capita adjusted for purchasing power parities (GDP per capita, PPP US$) to measure “all the 
dimensions of human development not reflected in a long and healthy life and in knowledge” 
(ibid.: 355-356).
18
 Finally, having calculated the values on the sub indices, the scores are 
simply aggregated to get the final Human Development Index by taking the unweighted mean 
of the three sub-components. This produces an overall index with values reaching from a 
theoretical maximum value of 1 and a theoretical minimum value of 0. 
  
                                                 
17
 Although being aware of the stark criticism which has directed against the HDI index from scholars such as 
Raj (1998), I find this to be the best available indicator, by which a sufficiently high number of countries are 
measured. 
18
 There has been a change in the measurement of decency of life. While the 2007 index applied the gross 
domestic product, in 2010 the index uses the gross national income, which also includes interests and dividends.    
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Regulatory quality 
Labeled as “the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development”, the Regulatory Quality 
Index from the WGI (World Bank 2007a) captures the perhaps most important dimension of 
political risk, namely that of regulatory quality (Kaufmann et al. 2010b: 6). While perhaps 
representing one of the best available indicators of the risk that governments will implement 
regulations that could harm profits, using the RQI also has its clear limitations, as it is only 
measuring what I have earlier referred to as macro risk. In other words, as a proxy of 
regulatory quality, the RQI cannot identify the political risk associated with government 
regulations of a particular company or industry. On the other hand, however, since the quality 
of the general regulatory regime could be an indicator of the likelihood that governments will 
impose highly unfavourable regulations on one particular company, the RQI does, to a certain 
degree, function as a proxy for micro risk as well. Similar to the PSI index, the RQI index has 
a theoretical maximum value of 2.5 and a minimum value of -2.5. 
Corruption 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, corruption is a prominent feature of many of the 
countries included in this analysis. To operationalise the risk that stems from corruptive 
practices among politicians and state officials I have selected the Control of Corruption Index 
(CCI) from the WGI (World Bank 2007a). Capturing to what extent corruption, and the use of 
political power for private gains, is present within the government and the state apparatus, the 
CCI serves as a proxy of the likelihood that profits are lost or reduced as a consequence of 
rent seeking government polices and political practices that could significantly increase 
transaction costs. The variable has maximum and minimum values of -2.5 and 2.5 
respectively, where higher values are given to countries with better control of corruption.  
3.3.3 Control variables 
Proved reserves 
Upstream FDI within the petroleum industry are motivated by the acquisition of natural 
resources at a lower price than in the home markets (that is if there are any petroleum 
resources available at the home market). When making investments abroad, the amount of oil 
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and gas that is available for extraction is therefore a primary concern to multinational 
petroleum companies. However, to be interesting to multinational petroleum companies, 
fields and basins must also be potentially profitable. Taking both the amount of oil and gas, 
and the likelihood of profitable extraction into account, one of the most common indicators of 
the availability and potential profitability of oil and gas is proved reserves. Defined by the 
International Energy Agency (IEA 2008: 198) as “hydrocarbons that have been discovered 
and for which there is a 90% probability that they can be extracted profitably (on the basis of 
assumptions about cost, geology, technology, marketability and future prices)”, it seems quite 
obvious that the size of the proved reserves should influence the location of upstream FDI.
19
  
Based on numbers from the International Petroleum Encyclopedia (PennWell 2007), proved 
reserves in oil will be assigned in billion barrels (bbl), while the proved reserves of natural 
gas are operationalised using trillion cubic meters (tcf).
20
 Both variables are log transformed 
to remedy the potentially troublesome effects of substantial right skewness. 
WTO membership 
In the previous chapter it was mentioned that the scrutiny of international organisations 
should reduce the magnitude of expropriations and predatory regulatory policies. As proxy of 
the influence of international organisations I apply a binary variable, which based on the 2007 
membership overview, separates host countries that are members of the World Trade 
Organisation from those that are not (WTO 2010).
21
 Succeeding the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1995, the WTO consists of the three components: a set of 
principles and rules, an intergovernmental bargain process and a dispute settling mechanism 
(Oatley 2008: 23-29). While the principles and rules underline the importance of free trade, 
WTO also contributes to free and non-discriminating trade through its intergovernmental 
bargain process and its dispute settling mechanism. In accordance with the common practice 
of coding binary variables, membership is coded 1, while non-membership is assigned with 
the value 0. 
  
                                                 
19
 For more on classification of reserves, see World Energy Outlook (IEA 2008: 198-200). 
20
 As there are different methods to calculate proved reserves, the numbers have been cross-checked against the 
data in the BP Statistical Review. No significant deviations were detected.   
21
 The webpage does not specifically show the member states in 2007. Instead the time of entry is reported. This 
is why the reference is provided for year 2010.    
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Inflation rate 
Despite being put forward as one the most important obstacles to economic development and 
financial stability the economic and social costs of inflation are, according to Romer (2006: 
547), ambiguous. As I will not make this a lengthy affair, for now, I will assume that inflation 
influences companies’ entry decision through either of two effects: the direct uncertainty 
effect and/or the indirect signal effect. While the former effect increases uncertainty by 
making current and future price and costs estimates less reliable, the latter effect works 
together with political risk factors through its function as an indication of poor governance 
(ibid.: 550). To measure inflation rates this analysis applies the annual average inflation 
change as it is presented in the 2007 World Economic Outlook Database, which is publicised 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2007). To control for right skewness, the variable is 
entered logarithmically into the analysis.    
Population 
The rational behind including population as a control variable into the analyses can be found 
in the vast literature about civil war. According to scholars, such as Fearon and Laitin (2003: 
81), there are reasons to believe that countries with larger populations will be more prone to 
implode into civil war, as the number of potential rebels increases with higher population 
numbers. Furthermore, as the population increases, so too is the pressure on the society’s 
scarce resources. Considered in a context of political risk, countries with higher populations 
may thus appear as more risky, as there will generally be more people depraved for basic 
human demands. To measure population this analysis uses the 2007 data from the World 
Bank Group database (The World Bank 2007b). Again, as there are some observations (i.e. 
China and India) that exert disproportionately strong influence on the mean, the variable is 
log transformed to take into account right skewness. 
3.4 Analysing binary outcomes 
When the dependent variable is dichotomous, three of the basic assumptions of ordinary least 
square regression (OLS) are violated (Menard 2002: 6-11). First, as opposed to the case where 
the dependent variable is continuous, the relationship between the independent variables and 
the binary dependent variable cannot be regarded as linear. Instead the relationship between 
the dependent variable and the independent variables can be depicted as an S-shaped curve, 
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with marked floor and ceiling characteristics. Second, the assumption of homoscedasticity, 
which means that the residual variance is constant across different values of the independent 
variables, does not hold. The result is that the least square estimates do not always represent 
the most effective estimates, as standard errors are not minimised (ibid.: 7). Third and finally, 
residuals in logistic regression are not normally distributed; therefore, “the results of 
hypothesis testing or construction of confidence intervals for regression coefficients will not 
be valid” (ibid.: 7). 
Rendering ordinary OLS regression unsuitable for analysing binary outcome variables, the 
abovementioned violations call for an alternative model of estimation. Among these, the most 
frequently used is logistic regression, which, opposed to OLS regression, does not assume 
substantive linearity and normal and homoscedastic residual variance distribution. The 
logistic model, furthermore, uses maximum likelihood method of estimation, which although 
sharing the same purposes as least square methods (which is to minimise the standard errors), 
applies an iterative approach “to find the parameters that best fit the data“ (Skog 2005: 362). 
In the iterative process, a tentative estimation is tested and re-estimated until ”the 
improvement from one step to another becomes negligible”, ultimately leading to the 
maximisation of the log likelihood function, which expresses the likelihood of getting the 
observed value on the dependent variable given the values of the parameters and the 
independent variables (Menard 2006: 14).  
Coding the values as 1 and 0, in logistic regression, the mean of the dependent variable equals 
the probability “that a case will fall into the higher of the two categories for the variable” 
(Menard 2002: 6). Thus, with regard to the analyses conducted in this paper, the logistic 
regression model is aimed at estimating the probability that a company will be present in a 
host country given the values of their parameters. However, as the predicted probability of 
being present in a host country may either exceed or fall below the possible values of 1 and 0 
respectively, it might be more useful to express the probability of being present in a host 
country in relation to the probability of not being present in a host country. One way to obtain 
such a measure is to use odds, which is given by the formula: 
Odds = Y/(1-Y) 
, where Y is the probability of being present, while 1-Y is the probability of not being present 
in a host country (Skog 2006: 355).  
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One of the attractive features of odds is that they have a minimum value of 0. Unfortunately, 
in cases where Y > 0.5, the odds may still exceed 1. Given that the possible values on the 
dependent variable should all fall between 0 and 1, odds that exceed 1 are therefore 
problematic. To produce a dependent variable with no upper or lower threshold, we thus 
transform the dependent variable from odds to logits by taking the natural logarithm of the 
odds. The logit, which break even corresponds to the situation where the number of positive 
cases equals negative cases, has the advantage of being able, in principle, to vary from 
negative infinity, when the proportion is close to 0, to positive infinity, when the proportion is 
close to 1 (Skog 2005: 355). Furthermore, having transformed odds into logits, the 
relationship between the independent variables and the logit appears linear in form. This 
makes it possible to analyse binary outcomes by methods that share close similarity to 
traditional OLS. The model with the logit as the dependent variable is depicted in the 
following equation:  
Logit (upstfdi) = a + b1*pOILres + b2*pGASres + b3*WTO + b4*Inflation + b5*Population + 
b6*FHI + b7*PSI + b8*HDI + b9*RQI + b10*CCI + b11*PIW + b12*S_Ownship            
Despite its appealing characteristics, unfortunately, the logit has no intuitive interpretation. In 
commenting on the results from the analyses, the coefficients are thus transformed back to 
odds ratios (OR), which as illustrated below, are derived by taking the exponential function of 
the regression parameter 
OR = e
b
  
where e is the natural logarithm (2.718) and b is the regression parameter. 
To interpret the OR: when the regression parameters take on values above 0, the OR exceed 1. 
For example, when the parameter = 0.3, the OR = 1.35. In this case, the odds of being present 
increase with 35% when the independent variable increases with one unit. On the other hand, 
when the parameter falls below 0, indicating negative effect of the independent variable, the 
OR falls below 1, with the difference between 1 and the OR being the odds. For example, 
when the OR has a value of 0.75 the odds of being present decrease with 25% for every one 
unit increase in the independent variable. 
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3.5 Analysing structured data 
By investigating how companies differ in their ability to handle political risk, and if this is 
influencing the geographical allocation of upstream FDI, we are, in reality, analysing units on 
two different analytical levels. As illustrated by figure 3.1, the political risk indicators 
describe properties of level-1 units (host countries), while the O-specific advantages describe 
properties of level-2 units (companies). We are thus dealing with so-called structured or 
hierarchical data, in which the relationship between political risk and investment patterns are 
expected to be more similar when comparing host countries within one company’s investment 
portfolio, than if countries in different investment portfolios are compared across companies.
   
Figure 3.1 Structured data with companies as higher level units 
One of the consequences of having structured data is that one of the basic conditions in 
traditional logistic regression, namely that of independent observations, is violated. From the 
literature about non-hierarchical logistic regression we know that observation dependency 
creates less reliable estimations, as standard errors tend to be underestimated (Bickel 2007: 
111). All other things equal, this will increase the risk of making type-1 errors, which means 
that a true null-hypothesis is falsely rejected. To analyse data material with dyadic or 
hierarchic structure, we must therefore use a method that allows us to handle non-independent 
observations. The logistic multilevel regression model is such a method. 
The most important characteristic separating multilevel regression from classical regression is 
that intercepts and coefficients are allowed to vary across groups (Bickel 2007: 105, Snijders 
and Bosker 1999: 1). As illustrated in table 3.1, intercepts and coefficients are divided into a 
random and a fixed component. While the random components capture the variance in 
43 
 
intercepts and slopes across groups, the fixed components are analogue to ordinary level-1 
coefficients, and display a weighted average for intercepts and coefficients across all groups 
(Bickel 2007: 125-127).  
Table 3.1 Fixed and random components in multilevel modelling 
Model Equation Random comp. Fixed comp. 
Level-1 Logit(Y) = oj + 1jX1 + ij   
 
Level-2 
 
0j = 00 + 0j 
1j = 10 + 1j 
 
0j, 1j 
 
00, 10 
 
Full  
 
Logit(Y) = 00 + 10X1 + (0j + 1jX1 + ij) 
 
0j, 1jX1, ij 
 
00,  10X1 
 
3.5.1 Multilevel models with more complex structures 
The structure depicted in most multilevel models within the social sciences is an example of 
what is often denoted as “pure hierarchies” (Hox 2011: 314-315). In a pure hierarchy, the 
lower level units are nested or ordered according to the structure illustrated in figure 3.1. 
However, in reality, many of the phenomena studied in the social sciences include even more 
complex structures than the ones described in conventional multilevel models. To address the 
issue of more complex structures, scholars, such as Fielding and Goldstein (2006) and Hox 
(2011), have extended multilevel models to also include cross-classification and multiple 
memberships. While the former kind of structure refers to a situation where level-1 units may 
be classified according to more than one group variable (level-2 variable), the latter kind of 
structure is characterised by level-1 units belonging to more than one group at the same time 
(Hox 2011: 314-324).  
In this thesis, the data structure can be described as one of perfect multiple membership. As 
mentioned above, the dataset consists of 1300 company-country dyads, which may also be 
considered a hierarchic structure with host countries being grouped by the multinational 
petroleum companies’ investment portfolios. To allow the dependent variable to vary, every 
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host country included in the sample are paired with every multinational petroleum company, 
with some dyads being associated with negative outcomes (not present, 0), while others are 
assigned with positive value (present, 1). To approach the issue of perfect multiple 
membership, this thesis applies longitudinal analyses with repeated measures, of which the 
data structure shares a high degree of resemblance with perfect multiple membership. It is 
important, however, to have in mind that instead of repeatedly measuring the same level-2 
unit at different occasions (i.e. at different points in time) in this analysis we are using 
longitudinal modelling to measure multinational petroleum companies at different points in 
space (i.e. host countries). 
3.6 Analysing interaction 
According to the abovementioned hypotheses, multinational petroleum companies´ O-specific 
advantages (Z) are expected to modify, or amplify, the effect of political risk (X) on the odds 
of being present with upstream FDI in a country (Y). To investigate this issue, cross-level 
interaction terms are included into the logistic multilevel regression models. Being the 
“product of the two independent variables thought to interact in their effects on the dependent 
variable”, by including interaction terms into the basic models, it becomes possible to monitor 
the joint effect of two, or more, variables and to evaluate their significance (Friedrich 1982: 
798).  
Despite their appealing properties, the inclusion of interaction terms into regression models 
does not come free of costs. First, when interaction terms are included in the basic model, the 
interpretation of the included coefficients becomes less straightforward (Friedrich 1982: 798). 
Instead of being the measurement of the general effect of either variable, the coefficients are 
now showing the effect of either two, or more, variables, when the other included variables 
are assigned with the reference value, which in most cases is the value 0 (Skog 2005: 303-
304). Whether or not this change of interpretation poses a threat against the scientific value of 
the analysis will not be debated in detail here. However, as interaction terms seem to be used 
rather vigorously in regression analyses, it appears that the potential loss of intuitiveness is 
justified by the information that can be gained from specifying regression models with 
interaction terms.  
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The second consequence of including interaction terms into regression models is that the 
hypothesis testing becomes somewhat more intricate. As explained by Braumoeller (2004: 3-
4), when an interaction term is included in a model, one cannot interpret significance 
independently of the value on the other variable(s) included in the interaction term.
22
 For 
example, if the PSI coefficient is significant when the variable is part of an interaction term, 
any assessments of its significance are restricted to the situation where the value of the other 
variable is 0. For simplicity, let us say that the other variable is a dichotomy separating the 
largest multinational petroleum companies (0) from other multinational petroleum companies 
(1). Since the PSI coefficient is now showing the effect of political instability for the largest 
companies, assessments about its significance is confined to the observations that fall into the 
reference category on the other variable, which in this case are multinational petroleum 
companies with PIW value <90. According to some scholars, such as Brambor et al. (2006) 
and Ai and Norton (2003), the conditionality that characterise the effects in multiplicative 
regression models renders assessments about significance based on the statistical significance 
of the interaction term, somewhat less precise. The reason for this is that even if the 
interaction term, itself, turns out as non-significant, the interaction effect may still be 
significant for most observations (Ai and Norton 2003: 129). 
To address the issue of the statistical significance of conditional effects, I will complement 
the traditional t-statistics with F-tests, in which the joint significance of the interaction term 
and its constituent components are tested.
23
 In these tests, the hypothesis that the interaction 
term and its constituent coefficient are all simultaneously 0, is tested. If this is not the case, 
we cannot reject that the variables are jointly significant. Following Blackwell (2008: 3), F-
tests of joint significance are particularly suitable for testing interaction and quadratic terms, 
“as these will only have no effect at all when both coefficients are all of their constituent 
coefficients are equal to zero”. This does not mean that I will disregard the results from the t- 
statistics, as they may still provide valuable information about the significance of the 
interaction effect for a substantial portion of the observations. In cases where the interaction 
term or the constituent coefficients are displaying non-significant effects, confronted with F-
statistics indicating joint significance, I will, provided that the effects are fairly strong, thus 
                                                 
22
 This is why scholars, such as Friedrich (1982), Ai and Norton (2003) and Brambor et al. (2006), stress the fact 
that effects found in multiplicative models are conditional and not average effects.    
23
 In several articles about interactions, the sub components are integrated into the pluralised “interaction terms”. 
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assume that “something significant is going on in the data”, thereby adding contingent to the 
reported results (Friedrich 1982: 821).       
A third and final concern surrounding the inclusion of interaction terms is multicollinearity. 
Since interaction terms, almost by definition, are strongly correlated with the variables 
included in the terms, multicollinearity may become a problem.
24
 This problem can, however, 
partly be mitigated through mean centering, by which every value on a variable are subtracted 
of the variable mean. The result is a new variable with zero as the new mean. There are two 
ways of centering variables in multilevel regression analyses: grand mean centring and group 
mean centring. As the names suggest, when centering at the grand mean, the mean of all 
observations is subtracted from every value on a variable. This is the usually procedure in 
non-hierarchical regression. In multilevel models, it is also possible to centre at the group 
mean, which means that level-1variables are subtracted of the mean of the group they belong 
to. According Enders and Tofighi (2007: 132) this is the better method when interaction 
effects are of substantial interest. Following this recommendation, in the upcoming analyses 
level-1 variables are therefore centered at the group mean. Before moving on the analysis a 
few words of precaution is warranted. Although centering variables may reduce 
multicollinearity between an interaction term and its components, in the case where one of the 
components is a categorical variable, transforming the value 0 to the variable mean would 
yield less meaningful interpretations. As this is the case in this analysis, where the two higher 
level variables are both dichotomous, a fairly high degree of multicollinearity is, despite its 
potential costs, therefore tolerated.  
3.7 A few words about causation 
If one accepts Gerring’s (2008: 169) minimal definition of causes, which suggests that causes 
may be defined as “events and conditions that raise the probability of some outcome 
occurring”, the ability to establish causality based on the findings in this thesis becomes 
somewhat restricted. The inability to draw causal inferences is, first and foremost, limited by 
the fact that the presence of multinational petroleum companies may, in fact, increase the 
level of political risk in a country.
25
 As such, the cause and the effect may not be independent 
of each other. Moreover, as discussed above, dependence between the included independent 
                                                 
24
 The consequences of multicollinearity are, according to Hamiliton (2009: 224), increased standard errors, 
unexpected changes in coefficient magnitudes or signs, and non-significant coefficients despite a high R
2
.   
25
 This is discussed in some detail in chapter five. 
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variables may, furthermore, hamper the ability to make causal inferences. In quantitative 
research designs, such as the one applied here, dependent causes manifest themselves as 
multicollinearity between the independent variables, which, among other things, means that 
the unique cause of a given effect becomes more difficult to detect. Finally, following from 
the discussion in the previous chapter about sources, mechanisms and effects of political risk, 
it seems clear that the current research design is unable to fully take into account the causal 
mechanisms, i.e. the range of intermediate effects in the process connecting the ground cause 
to the effect. For this reason, and those mentioned above, this thesis does therefore not aspire 
to establish causality between, on one hand, political risk and O-specific advantages, and, on 
the other hand, the presence of multinational petroleum companies. 
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4 Analyses 
In this chapter I will present and discuss the results from the formal analyses. To get a better 
overview of the data material, the chapter begins with a preliminary analysis, in which the 
data is analysed without the inclusion of interaction terms. In section two, the models are then 
extended with interaction terms to test the hypotheses put forward in chapter two. The results 
from these models are first presented and described before being subjected to regression 
diagnostics and robustness tests.  
Although statistical significance may be of somewhat less interest due to the fact that the 
observations are not randomly selected and that the standard errors are not adjusted for a 
finite population, standard errors and the significance of the coefficients are, nevertheless, 
reported. Furthermore, despite being less intuitive than odds and odds ratios, in the upcoming 
analyses, the results are reported in logits. The rational behind this decision rests on two 
grounds. First, according to Menard (2010: 15), the logit is, mathematically, the better way to 
analyse dichotomous dependent variables because the logit is linearly related to the 
independent variable. To improve the reader friendliness, when commenting on the results the 
logits are, however, transformed back to OR, which have a more intuitive meaning. Second, 
as the focal point in the second part of this analysis is interaction effects, using the logit scale 
provides more intuitive interpretations, because when reported in logits, the interpretation of 
the interaction terms is similar to that in ordinary least square regression (Skog 2005: 414). 
4.1 Preliminary analysis 
In the preliminary analysis, the effect of political risk is being investigated without the 
inclusion of interaction effects. To take into account the non-independence that characterises 
relations between observations in longitudinal data structures (remember that longitudinal 
data is the same as repeatedly measuring each company across the same host countries), I 
have a fitted a random-intercept model, in which the intercept is allowed to vary between 
companies. To control for the individual effect of each source of political risk, the political 
risk variables are, in accordance with the hypotheses, entered separately into different models 
before fitting the full models, which includes all political risk variables and the two company 
variables. The results from the preliminary analysis are depicted in table 4.1, where standard 
errors are reported in parentheses below the logit coefficients. Sample, variance and summary 
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statistics are, furthermore, reported for each model, with the sample size and number of 
groups being reported for each model. For variance, the intraclass correlation is reported 
using rho, while the summary statistics report the log likelihood function and the Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC). 
Table 4.1 Results from preliminary analysis 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
fhi_rev 0.102* 
    
0.110* 0.110* 0.110* 
 
(0.052) 
    
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061) 
psi 
 
0.233** 
   
0.280** 0.280** 0.280** 
  
(0.102) 
   
(0.129) (0.129) (0.129) 
hdi 
  
1.127 
  
-0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
   
(0.722) 
  
(0.940) (0.941) (0.940) 
rqi 
   
0.197 
 
0.373** 0.374** 0.373** 
    
(0.127) 
 
(0.187) (0.185) (0.187) 
cci 
    
-0.091 -0.746*** -0.746*** -0.746*** 
     
(0.168) (0.253) (0.253) (0.253) 
piw2 
      
-1.129*** 
 
       
(0.304) 
 
s_ownship2 
       
-0.019 
       
 
(0.361) 
       
  
ln_poilres2 0.160** 0.149** 0.143** 0.160** 0.164*** 0.157** 0.158** 0.157** 
 
(0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.062) (0.055) (0.065) (0.065) 
ln_pgasres2 -0.006 -0.026 -0.034 -0.023 -0.020 0.055 0.055 0.055 
 
(0.056) (0.057) (0.061) (0.059) (0.064) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) 
ln_inflation 0.274*** 0.331*** 0.322*** 0.368*** 0.252** 0.327*** 0.327*** 0.327*** 
 
(0.106) (0.107) (0.108) (0.121) (0.112) (0.123) (0.124) (0.124) 
ln_population 0.107** 0.189*** 0.152*** 0.138*** 0.113** 0.132** 0.132** 0.132** 
 
(0.042) (0.051) (0.045) (0.042) (0.045) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
wto -0.271 -0.169 -0.126 -0.207 0.050 -0.123 -0.123 -0.123 
 
(0.199) (0.180) (0.178) (0.190) (0.202) (0.221) (0.221) (0.221) 
cons -2.459*** -2.307*** -3.129*** -2.252*** -2.376*** -2.991*** -2.162*** -2.984*** 
  (0.363) (0.354) (0.639) (0.356) (0.377) (0.798) (0.810) (0.808) 
N 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 
Groups 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 
rho 0.157 0.157 0.156 0.156 0.160 0.160 0.098 0.160 
log likelihood -653.234 -652.522 -653.901 -653.925 -654.990 -646.482 -640.909 -646.480 
AIC 1322.469 1321.045 1323.802 1323.851 1325.980 1316.965 1307.820 1318.962 
* p<0.10   ** p<0.05   *** p<0.01  
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By indicating a weakly positive tendency toward more democratic institutions being preferred 
by multinational petroleum companies, the result from model 1 shows that an increase of one 
unit on the reversed FHI increases the log odds of being present with 0.102. Transformed into 
OR the value is 1.107, which means that the odds of being present increases with around 10% 
when the reversed FHI increases with one unit. The effect is significant, albeit at the 10% 
level only. When entered into model 7 and 8, the effect of political regime becomes somewhat 
stronger, with the log odds now increasing with 0.110 when the reversed FHI increases with 
one unit. While still only significant at the 10% level, these results show that the odds that 
multinational petroleum companies are present now increases with around 11% (OR =1.11) 
when the regime indicator increases with one unit.  
Significant at the 5% level, and with a weak positive effect when analysed separately, the 
results displayed in model 2 tell us that the log odds of being present with upstream FDI 
increases with 0.233 when PSI increases with one unit. In other words, it appears that political 
instability is discouraging multinational petroleum companies from making investments, as 
the odds of being present with upstream FDI increases with around 26% (OR = 1.26) for 
every unit of improvement in the political stability indicator. Similar to the reversed FHI, the 
effect becomes stronger when the PSI is entered into model 7 and 8, in which the effect of a 
one unit increase in the PSI equals an increased odds of being present with upstream FDI of 
32% (OR= 1.32). The results are also significant at the 5% level.  
Displaying a strong positive effect on the log odds that multinational petroleum companies 
are present with upstream FDI when considered separately in model 3 (logit = 1.127), in 
model 7 and 8, the effect of human development displays a considerable shift in direction and 
strength. Here, a one unit increase in the HDI now appears to reduce the log odds of being 
present with upstream FDI with -0.011. Equalling an OR of 0.98, the effect is, however, not 
significant at any sensible level.  
Conforming to the expectations, which were made in formulating hypotheses 4a and 4b, in 
model 4, the effect of a unit increase in the RQI increases the log odds of being present with 
0.197. The effect is, however, non-significant. In 7 and 8, the effect of regulatory quality 
becomes considerably stronger, now displaying an increased log odds of being present of 
0.374 and 0.373 respectively. Corresponding to an OR of approximately 1.45, these results 
indicate that the odds of being present with upstream FDI increases with 45% for every one 
unit increase in the RQI. These results are also significant at the 5% level. 
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The results provided in model 5 show that a one unit increase in the perceived degree of 
corruption decreases the log odds that multinational petroleum companies are present with 
upstream investment FDI, with -0.091. The result, which although non-significant, thus 
suggests that a one unit improvement in the perceived level of corruption (remember that 
higher values indicate less corruption) is accompanied with a reduction of the odds of being 
present of nearly 9% (OR =0.91). When analysed together with the other political risk 
indicators in model 7 and 8, the tendency depicted in model 5 becomes considerably stronger. 
While now also significant at the 1% level, the result in model 7 and 8 shows that an 
improvement of one unit on the corruption perception scale, reduces the log odds of being 
present with -0.746, corresponding to an odds of almost 53% (OR = 0.47). 
Besides reporting regression coefficients and standard errors, table 4.1 also displays a 
variance estimator for each model. Representing an expression of the conditional intraclass 
correlation (ICC), in this analysis, rho is a measure of how much of the variation in the 
dependent variable that can be explained by variation between companies (Rabe-Hesketh and 
Skrondal 2008: 249).
26
 As there is no clear cut-off point, above which the ICC is considered 
to be high enough to make multilevel modelling preferable to traditional single-level 
regression, any judgment concerning the suitability of multilevel modelling as opposed to 
traditional logistic regression is necessarily rather arbitrary. However, with approximately 9-
16% of the variation in upstream investment patterns being caused by variation between 
companies, it seems that fitting a multilevel model is warranted.  
To assess the goodness-of-fit of the models fitted in the preliminary analysis, I have included 
two summary statistics to measure whether the logistic multilevel regression models are 
adequate in describing the data. The first of these statistics is the log likelihood, which takes 
on higher values for more properly fitted models. As shown in table 4.1, model 7 has the 
highest log likelihood value. When compared with model 6, which is nested within model 7, 
the improvement in fit also turns out as significant.
27
 Similar tests between model 8 and 
model 6 do, on the other hand, indicate that model 8 is too complex relative to its power. 
While suggesting that measures should be taken to reduce the complexity, since the difference 
                                                 
26
   Stating the same, a common way of explaining the intraclass correlation is that the intraclass correlation is an 
expression of ”the degree of dependence of individuals [host countries] upon a higher structure [company 
investment portfolios] to which they belong” (Hox 2011: 220).   
27
 This result is obtained by conducting a likelihood ratio test, in which the difference in log likelihood values of 
nested models is compared based on chi square statistics. 
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between the two log likelihood values is not statistically significant, I will tolerate this for 
now.  
Further evaluating the goodness-of-fit, table 4.1 also reports the Akaike Information Criteria 
(AIC), which takes on lower values for more properly fitted models.
28
 Being based on the log 
likelihood value, the AIC parts from the log likelihood function, in that it punishes models 
with higher complexity. As shown in table 4.1, model 7 has the lowest value, which indicates 
that the inclusion of the PIW2 indicator increases the explanatory power more than it 
increases the complexity. For model 8, the AIC value indicates poorer fit, which in light of 
the previous evaluations, is not at all surprising. 
4.1.1 Regression diagnostics 
As displayed in table 4.1, some of the political risk sources are either non-significant or their 
effects indicate weak or even positive relationships between political risk and the odds of 
being present with upstream FDI. Given the theoretical framework, these unexpected results 
should lead us to question whether the conditions, which the logistic multilevel regression 
model rests upon, are in any way violated. As mentioned in the previous chapter, when 
analysing binary dependent variables, assumptions about the distribution of the residuals need 
to be less restricted when compared to ordinary least square regression. However, similar to 
the assumptions underlying OLS regression, the logistic regression model assumes 1) 
adequate measurement, 2) independence of observations/residuals, 3) non-influence of 
confounding variables and 4) absence of perfect or substantial multicollinearity (Menard 
2010: 125). Since the first three assumptions have been thoroughly treated in the previous 
chapter they will not be discussed here. This leaves us to explore whether or not the results 
are inflated by multicollinearity, which is a situation where “the independent variables are 
correlated with one another” (ibid.: 126).  
So far treated as distinct sources of political risk, there are, however, reasons to suspect that 
multicollinearity may be present within the data material. First, since several of the 
phenomena, of which the independent variables represent operationalisations, do tend to 
occur simultaneously, correlations among the independent variables are likely to be persistent. 
Second, as three out of five risk variables originate from the same source, similarity in coding 
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 AIC = 2*K – 2*LL, where K is the number of independent variables and LL the likelihood function. 
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procedures may, unintended, cause correlation when entered into the same model. The results 
provided by correlation analyses show that one pair of indicators correlate more than 0.80, 
with the RQI and CCI displaying correlation of 0.82.
29
 For the remaining variables, the 
correlation values do not raise serious concerns about severe multicollinearity, as most 
display moderate correlations, not exceeding 0.60.   
Although able to provide suggestions about the presence of multicollinearity, correlations do 
not reflect the entire cause of multicollinearity, as more than two independent variables may 
be jointly correlated. To address the potential problem of multicollinearity the correlation 
values are thus complemented with the  Variance Inflation Factor (VIF),  which measures 
each independent variables´ effect on the other coefficients´ variances and standard errors 
(Hamilton 2009: 226). As illustrated by table 4.2, as expected, the variables that exhibit the 
highest correlations also have to have the highest VIF value, with both RQI and the CCI 
displaying VIF values above four. Of the other variables, the HDI and the LN_PGASRES 
also display VIF values that may cause some concern, with both having VIF values above 
three.
30
 
Table 4.2 VIF values of model 7 and 8 
Variable  Model 7 Model 8 
cci 5.08 5.08 
rqi 4.17 4.17 
ln_pgasres 3.30 3.30 
hdi 3.12 3.12 
psi 2.62 2.62 
wto 2.03 2.03 
ln_poilres 2.01 2.01 
ln_population 1.84 1.84 
fhi_rev 1.84 1.84 
ln_inflation 1.75 1.75 
piw2 1.00   
s_ownship2   1.00 
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 The results are depicted in appendix D. 
30
 To date, scholars have not yet reached an agreement on a VIF value, above which multicollinearity is 
perceived to be persistent enough to justify deletion or other alterations of the variable matrix. Any judgments 
about the scope of multicollinearity based on VIF values should thus be treated with caution. 
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4.1.2 Robustness and sensitivity tests 
Do the results provided in model 7 and 8 hold when the variable matrix is altered or if the 
models are respecified? This is the question which robustness tests seek to answer. In the 
attempt to answer the question two robustness tests are deployed. First, I apply a sensitivity 
test, where variables are removed from the variable matrix. Second, to exclude that the results 
are the product of the chosen estimation technique, the data material is analysed using 
alternative estimation techniques. 
As shown in table 4.1, the HDI displays a dramatic shift in direction when included in model 
7 and 8. Estimating the opposite effect of human development than expected, the coefficient 
is also turning out as non-significant in both models. According to Gelmann and Hill (2007: 
69), “if a predictor is not statically significant and does not have the expected sign, [one 
should] consider removing it from the model”. Based on this, model 7 and 8 are thus refitted, 
now excluding the HDI. The results from these models are shown in model R1 and R2 in 
table 4.3.  
Revealed by the regression diagnostics, the RQI and the CCI are highly correlated with each 
other. As high correlations between independent variables deprive models of power while 
also leading to increased complexity, these results merit some further investigation. Thus, to 
test whether the results, displayed in model 7 and 8, are severely affected by the high 
correlation between the RQI and CCI, in table 4.2 the RQI is, in turn, excluded from model 7 
and 8.    
Finally, to test whether the results yielded in model 7 and 8 are contingent on the chosen 
estimation technique, two respecifications are made. In model R5 and R6, model 7 and 8 are 
respecified, using a non-hierarchical logistic model with clustered standard errors. By adding 
the cluster option, the model should be able to handle structured data without having to resort 
to multilevel modelling. Furthermore, as petroleum companies have been assigned to the 
group level (level 2), in model R7 and R8 the results provided in table 4.1 are checked by 
reversing the hierarchical order. 
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Table 4.3 Results from robustness and sensitivity tests 
  Model R1 Model R2 Model R3 Model R4 Model R5 Model R6 Model R7 Model R8 
fhi_rev 0.109* 0.109* 0.133** 0.133** 0.103 0.098 0.103 0.098 
 
(0.056) (0.056) (0.059) (0.059) (0.069) (0.066) (0.075) (0.069) 
psi 0.280** 0.279** 0.317** 0.317** 0.263** 0.251** 0.257* 0.245* 
 
(0.114) (0.114) (0.128) (0.128) (0.107) (0.103) (0.152) (0.145) 
hdi 
  
-0.036 -0.036 -0.007 -0.004 -0.036 -0.034 
   
(0.938) (0.938) (0.850) (0.812) (1.111) (1.060) 
rqi 0.374** 0.373**     0.350** 0.333* 0.362 0.343 
 
(0.187) (0.187)     (0.188) (0.177) (0.225) (0.214) 
cci -0.747*** -0.746*** -0.428** -0.428** -0.698*** -0.664*** -0.705** -0.669** 
 
(0.251) (0.251) (0.196) (0.196) (0.247) (0.235) (0.303) (0.288) 
piw2 -1.129*** 
 
-1.124***   -1.047*** 
 
-1.070*** 
 
 
(0.452) 
 
(0.303)   (0.283) 
 
(0.144) 
 s_ownship2 
 
-0.019   -0.019   -0.086   -0.088 
  
(0.361)   (0.359)   (0.296)   (0.141) 
ln_poilres2 0.157** 0.157** 0.153** 0.153** 0.148** 0.141** 0.147** 0.140** 
 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.065) (0.065) (0.067) (0.065) (0.078) (0.074) 
ln_pgasres2 0.055 0.055 -0.046 -0.046 0.051 0.049 0.051 0.048 
 
(0.066) (0.066) (0.068) (0.068) (0.064) (0.061) (0.081) (0.77) 
ln_inflation 0.327*** 0.327** 0.242** 0.242** 0.308** 0.294** 0.311** 0.296** 
 
(0.122) (0.122) (0.115) (0.115) (0.131) (0.122) (0.146) (0.139) 
ln_population 0.132** 0.132** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.124** 0.118** 0.126** 0.120** 
 
(0.056) (0.056) (0.053) (0.053) (0.059) (0.057) (0.063) (0.060) 
wto -0.122 -0.122 -0.154 -0.154 -0.115 -0.110 -0.129 -0.122 
 
(0.215) (0.215) (0.220) (0.220) (0.188) (0.179) (0.264) (0.252) 
cons -2.170*** -2.992*** -2.024** -2.842*** -2.035** -2.645*** -2.072** -2.689*** 
  (0.452) (0.437) (0.809) (0.800) (0.829) (0.738) (0.927) (0.883) 
N 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 
Groups 26 26 26 26   
 
45 45 
rho 0.098 0.160 0.097 0.159   
 
0.030 0.024 
log likelihood -640.505 -646.480 -642.981 -648.489 -659.143 -685.689 -656.976 -684.030 
AIC 1305.082 1316.962 1309.838 1320.979 1342.281 1395.379 1339.953 1394.062 
* p<0.10   ** p<0.05   *** p<0.01  
 
As shown in table 4.3 the robustness tests seem to conform to previous findings. In model R1 
and R2, when HDI are excluded from the model 7 and model 8 respectively, the effects are 
fairly consistent with the ones displayed in table 4.1. This suggests that the HDI, regardless of 
its lack of significance and unexpected sign, does not seriously obscure the results depicted in 
model 7 and 8.
31
 While still significant at the 10% and 5% level respectively, the reversed 
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 The results from likelihood ratio tests show no significant improvement in model fit when HDI is excluded. 
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FHI and the PSI are still exerting positive, albeit somewhat weaker effect on the odds that 
multinational petroleum companies are present with upstream FDI. Furthermore, the CCI is 
still negative and significant at the 1% level. Finally, the RQI is, as before, significant at the 
5% level and exhibits strength identical to the ones displayed in model 7 and 8.    
Having removed the RQI, in model R3 and R4, the results for the reversed FHI and PSI are 
relatively consistent with previous findings. In similar fashion, a unit change in the HDI still 
reduces the odds of being present with upstream FDI. The effect is, however somewhat 
stronger. Moving on to the effect of the CCI, the result displayed model R3 and R4 conforms 
to the result displayed in table 4.1, as a unit improvement in the CCI is still exerting negative 
influence on the odds of being present with upstream FDI. However, now only significant at 
the 5% level, the effect is also weaker, which indicates that the correlation, which was 
revealed by the diagnostics, does, to a certain degree, obscure the measured effect of 
corruption. Regardless of this, however, because removing the RQI from model 7 and 8 does 
not lead to a significant improvement in the model fit, and that the two variables display 
opposite signs, in subsequent analyses the RQI is therefore re-included.
32
   
The results from altering the estimation technique are generally consistent with earlier 
findings. In model R5 and R6 the results from fitting a logistic model with clustered standard 
are displayed. While most of the effects are generally somewhat weaker than in model 7 and 
model 8, they do general appear to be just as significant and with identical signs as depicted in 
table 4.1. Furthermore, as shown by the AIC values, model 7 and model 8 seem to be the most 
properly fitted models, since both model R5 and R6 display higher values.  
Proceeding to model R7 and R8, in which the hierarchical order is revered, the effects are, 
just as in the model R5 and R6, somewhat weaker than in model 7 and 8. More important, 
however, is the fact that many of the significant variables experience a drop in the 
significance levels when compared to model 7 and model 8. As it is generally assumed to be 
better to enhance the number of higher order observations, from these results we might then 
conclude that it would be better to turn the hierarchical order around. However, as revealed by 
the AIC, model 7 and 8 display lower values, indicating better fit. 
                                                 
32
 While the former argument is technical, the latter suggests that there might be some different mechanisms at 
play when comparing the effect of regulatory quality and corruption. Hence, excluding RQI would be at the risk 
of loosing out on important knowledge.   
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4.2 Main analysis 1: Company size 
In the second section of the analysis, model 7 from the preliminary analysis is extended with 
interaction terms between the PIW2 indicator and the political risk variables. To avoid overly 
complex models and problems with interpreting the coefficients, only one interaction term is 
included in each model. As before, in the effects are reported in logits, with coefficients being 
transformed to OR when commenting on the results. To be able to assess and compare the 
models with interaction terms with model 7, the log likelihood function and the AIC are also 
reported. While the target of the upcoming analyses is to analyse if company size and state 
ownership can moderate the effect of political risk, in the following analyses, I will only 
comment on the political risk coefficient and the interaction term. Given the symmetry that 
characterise interaction terms, analysing only one side of the term should not cause serious 
problems with the interpretation of the effects. 
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Table 4.4 Results from main analysis 1 
  Model IP1 Model IP2 Model IP3 Model IP4 Model IP5 
fhi_rev 0.154* 0.110* 0.110* 0.112* 0.111* 
 
(0.086) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) 
psi 0.280** 0.457*** 0.282** 0.282** 0.280** 
 
(0.129) (0.172) (0.129) (0.129) (0.129) 
hdi -0.020 -0.004 1.608 -0.039 -0.015 
 
(0.942) (0.938) (1.226) (0.940) (0.939) 
rqi 0.373** 0.374** 0.374** 0.593*** 0.374** 
 
(0.187) (0.187) (0.188) (0.229) (0.187) 
cci -0.745*** -0.751*** -0.757*** -0.752*** -0.562* 
 
(0.253) (0.305) (0.255) (0.254) (0.299) 
piw2 -1.121*** 1.119*** -1.123*** -1.118*** -1.130*** 
 
(0.304) (0.305) (0.306) (0.305) (0.304) 
piw2_fhi_rev -0.067 
    
 
(0.094) 
    piw2_psi 
 
-0.271 
   
  
(0.172) 
   piw2_hdi 
  
-2.452** 
  
   
(1.165) 
  piw2_rqi 
   
-0.336* 
 
    
(0.200) 
 piw2_cci 
    
-0.285 
     
(0.248) 
ln_poilres 0.157** 0.159** 0.159** 0.158** 0.158** 
 
(0.065) (0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.045) 
ln_pgasres 0.056 0.053 0.054 0.055 0.054 
 
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) 
ln_inflation 0.327*** 0.327*** 0.328*** 0.325*** 0.324*** 
 
(0.123) (0.124) (0.124) (0.123) (0.123) 
ln_population 0.132** 0.134** 0.133** 0.133** 0.133** 
 
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
wto -0.121 -0.130 -0.128 -0.131 -0.126 
 
(0.220) (0.220) (0.220) (0.220) (0.220) 
cons -1.824 -2.357*** -2.185*** -2.354*** -1.721 
  (0.867) (0.793) (0.453) (0.830) (0.781) 
N 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 
Groups 26 26 26 26 26 
Rho 0.098 0.098 0.099 0.098 0.098 
log likelihood -640.653 -639.655 -638.661 -639.501 -640.246 
AIC 1309.308 1307.311 1305.323 1307.003 1308.493 
* p < 0.10   ** p < 0.05   *** p < 0.01 
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In so fare as company size represents an effect modifier of political risk, the results in table 
4.4 are somewhat discouraging. In model IP1, there is a positive, albeit weak effect of 
political regime on the log odds of being present with upstream investment among the super 
majors (PIW2 = 0). For these companies, a one unit increase in the FHI increases the log odds 
of being present with upstream FDI with 0.154, which is equal to an increased odds of 16 %. 
Moving on to the effect of political regime on the log odds of being present with upstream 
FDI for the smaller petroleum companies (PIW2 = 1), there is a tendency towards smaller 
companies being less sensitive to the degree of democracy when compared to the super 
majors. For smaller companies a one unit increase in the reversed FHI is leading to an 
increased log odds of being present with upstream FDI of 0.154 + (-0.067) = 0.087, equalling 
an odds of 9%.  
As shown in model IP1, the reversed FHI, and PIW2 index display significant effects at the 
10% and 0.01% level respectively. The interaction term is, however, non-significant. To test 
whether the three variables are jointly significant, that is, that they are not all simultaneously 
0, I therefore conduct an F-test.
33
 With a joint p-value of 0.0006 we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the reversed FHI, the PIW2 and the interaction term are jointly significant. 
However, as the interaction term is extremely weak and non-significant, it appears to be 
contingent support for rejecting hypothesis 1a.  
Analysing whether company size represents an effect modifier on the effect of political 
instability, in model IP2 there is a moderate, positive effect of increased political stability 
among the super majors. Among these companies, a one unit increase in the level of political 
instability (remember that higher values are given to countries with more stability) increases 
the log odds of being present with upstream FDI with 0.457, which transforms to an increased 
odds of being present of 58%. For the smaller companies, the effect of political instability is, 
somewhat surprisingly, weaker, with the inclusion of the interaction term resulting in a 
moderated effect of political instability of 0.457 + (-0.271) = 0.186. Transformed back to 
odds, the result means that the odds of being present with upstream FDI among the smaller 
companies increases with 20% for every one unit reduction in the level of political instability.  
As can been seen in model IP2, the interaction term is non-significant. The variables in model 
IP2 are thus subjected to an F-test to check if they are jointly significant. Similar to earlier 
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 For more information about F-tests and their syntaxes, see Long and Freese (2006: 99-101). 
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findings, the test provides positive results (p = 0.0001), which suggest that the findings cannot 
be ruled out as significant. The results thus seem to undermine the assumptions made in 
formulating hypothesis 2a, which in light of these findings, is weakened. It should be noted, 
however, that since the interaction term is non-significant generalisations based on this result 
should be made with caution, as it only provides contingent support for rejecting hypothesis 
2a.   
In model IP3, the super majors and the smaller companies part from each other, as there is a 
change of direction when the smaller petroleum companies are compared to the super majors. 
While the effect of a unit increase in the HDI is strongly positive (1.608) among the super 
majors, for the smaller companies, there is a strong negative effect of 1.608 + (-2.452) = - 
0.844 following a unit increase in the level of human development. Corresponding to OR of 
4.99 and 0.40 respectively, according to these results, for the super majors, the odds of being 
present with upstream FDI increases with 399% for every unit increase in the HDI, whereas 
for smaller petroleum companies the identical increase in the level of human development 
lowers the odds of being present with 60%. Being jointly significant (p = 0.0004), these 
results speak strongly against hypothesis 3a, as the presence of upstream FDI of smaller 
companies, in fact, seem to be discouraged by higher levels of human development. The 
effect of human development is, however, non-significant among the super majors, which cast 
some doubt on the relevance of the HDI in explaining the presence of upstream FDI within 
the petroleum industry.      
The results from model IP4 show that among the super majors, a one unit increase in the 
perceived level of regulatory quality increases log odds of being present with upstream FDI of 
0.593. Corresponding to an OR of 1.81, this means that, for the largest companies, a one unit 
improvement in the RQI would increase the odds of being present with upstream FDI with 
81%. Turning to the interaction term, it displays a moderately negative effect, which contrary 
to hypothesis 4a, entails that for the smaller companies, an increase of one unit on the 
regulatory quality index is associated with an increased log odds of only 0.593 + (-0.336) = 
0.257. Thus, for smaller companies, the odds of being present with upstream FDI increase 
with only 29% for every unit improvement in regulatory quality. As before, the variables are 
jointly significant, with a p-value of 0.0005. Suggesting that smaller companies are more 
likely to invest in countries with lower regulatory quality than larger companies, the findings 
in model IP4 thus seem to reject hypothesis 4a.    
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In model IP5, the interaction between corruption and company size is analysed. For the super 
majors, a one unit increase on the CCI decreases the log odds of being present with upstream 
FDI with -0.562. As higher values on the CCI are assigned to countries with lower levels of 
corruption, this means that a one unit improvement in the level of corruption reduces the odds 
of being present with upstream FDI of 44% among the super majors. Considering the effect of 
corruption among the smaller companies, the negative effect is, contrary to hypothesis 5a, 
stronger for smaller companies when compared to the super majors. With a one unit 
improvement in the level of corruption now leading to a reduced log odds of being present 
with upstream of (-0.562) + (-0.285) = -0.847, the result shows that, for smaller companies, 
the odds of being present with upstream FDI decreases with 57% for each unit of 
improvement in the control of corruption. Jointly significant at the 0.01% level, these results 
appear to reject hypothesis 5a. However, as the interaction term is non-significant, caution is 
warranted when generalisations are made based on the findings in model IP5.   
Indicating poorer fit, the log likelihood values of model IP1 and IP5 are both lower than the 
corresponding value in model 7. Submitted to likelihood ratio tests, as expected, model IP1 
and IP5 fail to deliver significant improvements, a result most likely caused by the lack of 
significance of the interaction term. While the result for model IP2 indicates a non-significant 
improvement, for model IP3 and IP4, the inclusion of the interaction term yields significant 
improvements, albeit only at the 5% and 10% level respectively. Considering the AIC, the 
picture repeats itself as only model IP2, IP3 and IP4 display lower values than the baseline 
model. These differences do, on the other hand, only indicate marginal improvements. How 
should we go around with these results then? From a technical perspective, the lack of 
improvement when comparing model IP1, IP2 and IP5 to model 7 does, to some degree, 
indicate overfitting, in which the explanatory power does not increase with the relatively 
higher complexity introduced by the inclusion of the interaction term. While perhaps leading 
to the conclusion that the results from these models should be disregarded,  as I find even 
non-significant interaction terms to be of substantial interests, I believe, as they are all jointly 
significant, that it would be unfortunate to disregard the findings all together. Nevertheless, 
given the relatively weaker test, provided in testing for joint significance, a warning against 
too bombastic generalisations is thus warranted. 
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4.3 Main analysis 2: State ownership 
In the second analysis the interactions between state ownership and political risk is 
investigated. As mentioned in the previous chapter the original ownership variable, which is 
measuring the percentage of the shares that are owned by the state, is recoded into a new 
variable, S_OWNSHIP2. Separating petroleum companies with more than 50% state 
ownership (1) from those companies, in which the state owns less than half of the shares (0), 
the values on the new variable, are multiplied with the five political risk indicators. The 
results from the second analysis are depicted in table 4.5.  
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Table 4.5 Results from main analysis 2 
  Model IS1 Model IS2 Model IS3 Model IS4 Model IS5 
fhi_rev 0.218*** 0.115* 0.111* 0.116* 0.118* 
 
(0.069) (0.061) (0.069) (0.061) (0.061) 
psi 0.283** 0.494*** 0.285** 0.285** 0.279** 
 
(0.130) (0.147) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) 
hdi -0.058 -0.007 1.645 -0.093 0.018 
 
(0.946) (0.945) (1.063) (0.948) (0.945) 
rqi 0.382** 0.370** 0.375** 0.715*** 0.383** 
 
(0.188) (0.188) (0.188) (0.206) (0.188) 
cci -0.751*** -0.764*** 0.764*** -0.765*** -0.412 
 
(0.254) (0.255) (0.255) (0.256) (0.266) 
s_ownship2 -0.004 -0.014 -0.018 -0.027 -0.070 
 
(0.364) (0.364) (0.366) (0.366) (0.365) 
s_ownship2_fhi_rev -0.314*** 
    
 
(0.096) 
    s_ownship2_psi 
 
-0.579*** 
   
  
(0.175) 
   s_ownship2_hdi 
  
-4.320*** 
  
   
(1.153) 
  s_ownship2_rqi 
   
-0.927*** 
 
    
(0.210) 
 s_ownship2_cci 
    
-1.089*** 
     
(0.276) 
ln_poilres2 0.160** 0.159** 0.154** 0.168** 0.159** 
 
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
ln_pgasres2 0.057 0.055 0.057 0.049 0.052 
 
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
ln_inflation 0.330*** 0.327*** 0.332*** 0.330*** 0.323*** 
 
(0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.125) (0.124) 
ln_population 0.131** 0.136** 0.138*** 0.139*** 0.141*** 
 
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
wto -0.119 -0.130 -0.132 -0.144 -0.144 
 
(0.221) (0.222) (0.222) (0.223) (0.222) 
cons -2.649*** -3.232*** -3.046*** -3.191*** -2.601** 
  (0.862) (0.790) (0.441) (0.831) (0.777) 
N 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 
Groups 26 26 26 26 26 
Rho 0.163 0.163 0.165 0.164 0.163 
log likelihood -640.971 -640.927 -639.393 -636.277 -638.034 
AIC 1309.942 1309.854 1306.788 1300.556 1304.069 
* p < 0.10   ** p < 0.05   *** p < 0 .01 
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As illustrated by the results in model IS1, state ownership does seem to have the potential to 
modify the effect of political regime. First of all, the coefficient for the reversed FHI tells us 
that, for private companies, an increase of one unit on the reversed FHI is associated with 
increased log odds of being present with upstream FDI of 0.218. Equal to an OR of 1.24, this 
means that for private companies, the odds of being present with upstream FDI increases with 
24% for every one unit increase on the reversed FHI.  Considering the effect of political 
regime for state owned companies, a one unit increase in the democracy indicator results in an 
log odds of being present with upstream FDI of 0.218 + (-0.314) =  -0.096. Corresponding to 
an OR of 0.90, this means that for state owned companies, there is a negative, albeit weak 
effect of higher levels of democracy, as the odds of being present with upstream FDI 
decreases with around 10% following a unit improvement in the reversed FHI. Being jointly 
significant at the 0.01% level, the result from model IS1 thus seems to offer support for 
hypothesis 1b.  
According to the results provided in model IS2, state ownership almost eliminates the effect 
of political instability. Whereas the log odds of being present with upstream FDI increases 
with 0.494 for every one unit increase in the PSI among the private petroleum companies, for 
state owned petroleum companies the corresponding log odds is only 0.494 + (-0.579) = - 
0.085. Transformed into OR then, for private petroleum companies the odds of being present 
with upstream FDI increases with 64% for every unit improvement in political stability. For 
state owned companies the effect is weakly negative, with the odds of being present 
decreasing with around 8% following a unit increase in the PSI. As in model IP1, the results 
generated in model IS2 are jointly significant, indicating further support for hypothesis 2b.  
Following the pattern established in the previous models, in model IS3, the effect of human 
development is, to a considerable degree, reversed by state ownership. While there is a strong 
positive effect of a unit increase in the HDI among private petroleum companies (1.645), for 
state owned petroleum companies, there is a considerable change of direction, with a log odds 
of 1.645 + (-4.320) = -2.675: equalling an decreased odds of being present with upstream FDI 
of  93% succeeding a one unit increase in the HDI. Being jointly significant at the (p = 
0.0028), the findings in model IS3 thus seem to offer support for hypothesis 3b. However, it 
should be noted, that for private companies, the effect of the HDI is non-significant, resulting 
in only contingent support for hypothesis 3b.    
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As displayed in model IS4, for private companies, a one unit increase in the RQI causes an 
increase in the log odds of being present with upstream FDI of 0.715. In other words, for 
private petroleum companies, the odds of being present increases with around 104% for every 
unit increase in the regulatory quality. Moving on to consider the effect of regulatory quality 
for state owned companies, the effect of the RQI runs in the opposite direction, with an 
increase in the RQI of one unit now leading to a reduction of the log odds of being present 
with upstream FDI of 0.715 + (-0.927) = -0.212. Decreasing the odds of being present with 
upstream FDI with around 20% among state owned petroleum companies, the results in 
model IS4 are also jointly significant (p = 0.0000), which adds weight to hypothesis 4b. 
In model IS5, the interaction between corruption and state ownership is analysed. Conforming 
to the results from the preliminary analysis, when analysing the effect of corruption among 
private petroleum companies, the results in model IS5 show that a one unit increase in the 
CCI (remember that higher values equal less corruption) reduces the log odds of being present 
with upstream FDI, with -0.412. In other words, the odds of being present decrease with 
around 36% for every one unit improvement in the control of the corruption for private 
petroleum companies. For state owned companies the negative effect of less corruption is, 
somewhat, surprisingly, considerable stronger. Here, the log odds of being present with 
upstream FDI decreases with -0.412 + (-1.089) = - 1.501 following a unit increase in the CCI 
(the odds is accordingly decreasing with 77%). Although jointly significant (p = 0.0000), 
because only the interaction term is significant, the results from model IS5 can only offer 
contingent support for hypothesis 5b.   
Similar to the first analysis, summary statistics are reported in table 4.5. As shown by the log 
likelihood value, most models display higher values than model 8 from the preliminary 
analysis, indicating improved fit following the inclusion of interaction terms. The results from 
the likelihood ratio tests also show that these improvements are significant. Moving on to the 
AIC, the results are somewhat encouraging, as all models display lower values than the model 
8. Given that the AIC punishes more complexity, from these results then, it appears, that the 
inclusion of interaction terms increases the explanatory power sufficiently enough to offset 
the somewhat higher complexity introduced by the interaction terms.  
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4.4 Regression diagnostics 
As the main analyses have resulted in some unexpected and, at times, contingent findings, 
regression diagnostics are conducted to check if the assumptions, which the logistic multilevel 
model rests upon, are violated. Similar to the regression diagnostics in the preliminary 
analysis, the first diagnostics to be deployed here is a control of multicollinearity. 
Furthermore, dealing with heterogeneous observation units, such as states and companies, 
there are reasons to assume that some observations will deviate from the general trend. As 
such observations may obscure the coefficients and the standard errors, thereby leading to 
invalid results, measures will be taken to identify these observations and to analyse their 
effects. 
4.4.1 Multicollinearity 
To evaluate the impact of multicollinearity the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is reported for 
each model in table 4.6 and table 4.7.  As depicted in table 4.6, in model IP1 to IP5, 
multicollinearity between the interaction term and the included variables is present, with all 
political risk variables displaying VIF values exceeding four, and with VIF values exceeding 
six in model IP4 and model IP5. Due to high correlations between RQI and CCI (see table 
4.1), in model IP4 and IP5, the VIF values are somewhat lower when these variables, in turn, 
are excluded from model IP5 and IP4 respectively (the results are displayed in model IP4.1 
and model IP5.1).    
Table 4.6 VIF values for model IP1-IP5 
  Model IP1 Model IP2 Model IP3 Model IP4 Model IP5 Model IP4.1 Model IP5.1 
fhi_rev 4.55 
   
  
  psi 
 
5.33 
  
  
  hdi 
  
5.84 
 
  
  rqi 
   
6.89   5.11 
 cci 
    
7.79 
 
5.63 
piw2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 
piw2_fhi 3.72 
   
  
  piw2_psi 
 
3.72 
  
  
  piw2_hdi 
  
3.71 
 
  
  piw2_rqi 
   
3.72   
  piw2_cci         3.71 3.72 3.71 
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Moving on to model IS1 to IS5, the reported VIF values are provided in table 4.7. As seen in 
table 4.7, in model IS1 to IS3 the VIF values for the political risk coefficients are all below 
four. However, in similar fashion as in table 4.6, the level multicollinearity increases when 
models including the RQI and CCI are being analysed. To control for the additional 
multicollinearity that stems from the bivariate correlation between these two variables, model 
IS4 and IS5 are refitted, in turn excluding each variable (the corresponding VIF values are 
depicted in model IS4.1 and IS5.1). As before, the level of multicollinearity between the 
interaction term and the subcomponents becomes lower when the two variables are, in turn, 
removed from the analysis. 
Table 4.7 VIF values for model IS1-IS5 
  Model IS1 Model IS2 Model IS3 Model IS4 Model IS5 Model IS4.1 Model IS5.1 
fhi_rev 2.37 
   
  
  psi 
 
3.15 
  
  
  hdi 
  
3.65 
 
  
  rqi 
   
4.70   2.93 
 cci 
    
5.61 
 
3.45 
s_ownship2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 
s_ownship2_fhi 1.53 
   
  
  s_ownship2_psi 
 
1.53 
  
  
  s_ownship2_hdi 
  
1.53 
 
  
  s_ownship2_rqi 
   
1.53   
  s_ownship2_cci         1.53 1.53 1.53 
 
As illustrated in table 4.6 and 4.7, multicollinearity is by all means present within the data 
material. To check if the degree of multicollinearity is high enough to seriously undermine the 
validity of the results provided in table 4.4 and 4.5 I have refitted all models, now centering 
PIW2 and S_OWNSHIP2.
34
 The results from these models show that the degree of 
multicollinearity between the interaction term and the included variables does become lower 
when centering both of the higher order variables. However, as the results from table 4.4 and 
4.5 are generally reproduced, sacrificing meaningful interpretation for marginally better 
precision seems futile. Similarly, when the RQI and the CCI are, in turn removed from the 
analyses, the results conform to earlier findings. Hence, it does appear that the 
multicollinearity does not pose a serious threat against the validity of the results. 
                                                 
34
 For VIF values with centered level-2 variables, see appendix E. 
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4.4.2 Influential observations 
While there are several formal procedures to identify influential observations in non-
hierarchical regression models, the same cannot be said to be the case when conducting 
residual analyses in multilevel modelling. According to Snijders and Bosker (1999: 128) the 
basic problem when it comes to residual analysis in multilevel modelling, is that, the “level-
one residuals can be estimated so that they are unconfounded by the level-two residuals, but 
the other way around is impossible”.35 Based on this they thus recommend an upward 
approach, in which level-1 residuals are analysed within each group before moving on to 
analyses of level-2 residuals. Leading us through these procedures Snijders and Bosker (ibid.: 
134-135) present calculations, which ultimately lead to an adjusted Cook’s D. As calculating 
the adjusted Cook’s D for every higher order observation is outside the scope of this analysis, 
I will apply a hybrid approach, in which formal diagnostics measures, such as the Cook’s D, 
is used to identify influential level-1 observations. The influence of the level-2 observations 
is, on the other hand, investigated by comparing the effect and the significance of the 
interaction terms and their subcomponents, having in turn, deleted level-2 observations from 
the analyses. As deleting all companies from all models would entail a considerable number 
of models to be fitted, the selection of level-2 observations to be deleted will be based on 
theoretical considerations.  
Level-1 observations 
Before moving on to analysing the influence of the level-1 observations, it is important to 
have in mind that scholars have not yet reached an answer to how much influence is too much 
influence.
36
 Any cutoff point, above which the observations are either removed from the 
sample or submitted to further investigation, is thus somewhat arbitrary. In figure 4.1, a 
scatterplot connecting the host country identification variable (ID) with the Cook’s d, is 
depicted.
37
 As seen from the scatterplot there appear to be seven countries that exert some 
degree of influence on the parameter estimates. Having identified these observations as 
Algeria (1), Colombia (12), Egypt (15), Libya (25), Nigeria (30), Russia (37) and Saudi 
                                                 
35
 Because multilevel models have more than one type of residual, according to Hilden-Minton (1995: 47-49) it 
becomes more difficult to identify the “pure” disturbance that is generated by the residuals. 
36
 For a more thorough debate over numerical cutoffs, see Fox (1991: 32).     
37
 Given that the same countries are measured within each group, the unconfounded residuals are the same 
within all groups. 
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Arabia (38), the influence of these observations is investigated by, in turn, removing each 
country from model IP1-1P5 and from model IS1-IS5.
38
  
 
Figure 4.1 Influential level-1 observations 
Mainly exerting its influence in model IS5, when Algeria is removed from the sample, the 
effect of corruption becomes stronger and significant among the private petroleum companies. 
With a score on the CCI of -0.4, Algeria is located among the 25% least corrupted countries 
in the sample. At the same time, Algeria is host to nine of the 17 private companies. As such, 
Algeria is apparently working against the general trend, exerting positive pressure on the 
negative CCI coefficient.  
Having removed Colombia from the sample in model IP2, the interaction term now becomes 
somewhat stronger and significant (albeit at the 10% level only). Oppositely, when Colombia 
is removed from the sample in model IP4, the interaction term becomes weaker and non-
significant. Most notable, however, is the effect of suspending Colombia when considering 
the effect of corruption. In both IP5 and IS5, the effect of corruption becomes stronger and 
significant among the super majors and the private companies respectively. A short glance at 
the numbers reveals that Colombia, with a relatively low degree of corruption (-0.19) is host 
to five of seven super majors, while also hosting a majority of the private petroleum 
companies. From this then, it appears that Colombia goes against the general trend, where 
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lower levels of corruption is negatively correlated with the presence of super majors and 
private companies.  
Although leading to a somewhat weaker and less significant effect of political instability 
among the super majors in model IP2, the exclusion of Libya leads to a stronger and 
significant interaction effect (albeit at the 10% level only). Taking a look at the PSI value of 
Libya, it is assigned with a value of 0.58, which makes Libya the fourth most stable country 
in the sample (!). Hosting 16 of the companies in the sample, of which four out of the seven 
super majors are present, Libya thus seems to gain its influence as a most likely case, where 
more stability leads to increased odds of being present with upstream FDI. Moving on to 
model IP4, removing Libya from the sample results in a weaker and less significant effect of 
regulatory quality among the super majors. Furthermore, the interaction effect turns out as 
non-significant. With a RQI value of -1.03, Libya is placed among the lowest 50% of the 
countries. Given the presence of 16 multinational petroleum companies, in model IP4, Libya 
stands out at as something close to a least likely case.  
According to the results in table 4.7, Nigeria predominately exerts its influence, representing a 
least likely case in model IP3 and IS3. Assigned with a HDI value of 0.511, the third lowest 
in the sample, the country, nevertheless, hosts 15 of the petroleum companies included in the 
sample. Of these, six count as super majors. Following from this, when Nigeria is removed 
from the sample in model IP3 and IS3, there is a marked shift in the effect of human 
development, with the effect of the HDI among the super majors, respectively the private 
petroleum companies, now appearing both stronger and significant.  
Predominately exerting influence in model IP5 and IS5, when Russia is removed from the 
sample, the effect of corruption among the largest and the private companies becomes 
somewhat stronger. In model IP5, the effect of corruption for the super majors is now turning 
out as significant at the 0.1% level. The interaction effect is, on the other hand, still non-
significant. In model IS5, the effect of corruption among the super majors becomes somewhat 
stronger when Russia is removed from the sample. Moreover, the effect is now significant at 
the 5% level. Again turning to the data to find some explanations, Russia is assigned with a 
CCI score of -0.91. This renders Russia among the 25% most corrupt host countries in the 
sample. Hosting eight multinational petroleum companies, of which four are categorised as 
super majors, it thus seems inevitable that removing Russia from the sample will yield 
stronger effect for the super majors. 
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Being located among the 25% most developed countries in the sample (HDI = 0.843) and 
with only three private companies being present with upstream FDI, when removing Saudi 
Arabia from the sample in model IS3, not surprisingly, the effect becomes stronger and more 
significant among the private companies. Similarly, in model IS5, the removal of Saudi 
Arabia results in a stronger and now significant effect of corruption for the private petroleum 
companies. With a corruption score, which firmly place Saudi Arabia among the 25% most 
corrupted countries in the sample, one should, according to the general trend, expect several 
private companies to be present in the country. Again, however, as only three private 
companies are present it appears that Saudi Arabia is functioning as least likely case. 
Level-2 observations 
Driven by their country’s seemingly endless demand for energy, the Chinese state owned 
petroleum companies are frequently portrayed as following an aggressive expansion strategy 
(the Going Abroad Policy), supported by the government in Beijing (Lewis 2007: 18-48). 
Among the elements in this expansion strategy, the location of Chinese upstream FDI has 
received some attention, as the Chinese companies of China Petroleum National Corporation 
(CNPC), Sinopec and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) appear to have 
gained a solid foothold in perceived high-risk countries, such Sudan, Turkmenistan and 
Kazakhstan. Having, in turn, deleted the three Chinese petroleum companies from the sample, 
in model IP1, the removal of CNPC does lead to a stronger and now significant interaction 
effect (-0.167). Similarly, the estimated effect of democracy among the super majors becomes 
stronger (0.234).
39
 The effects are also jointly significant. Moving on to model IP2, the 
exclusion of CNPC again produce stronger and more significant effects. Most notable is the 
interaction term, which is now significant at the 5% level. In model IP4, by removing CNPC 
from the sample, there is a remarked shift in strength and significance of the interaction term. 
Originally with a value of -0.336 and significant at the 10% level only, the value is now -
0.600. The interaction is also significant at the 0.01% level. Finally, as CNPC is removed 
model IP5, the interaction term goes from being non-significant and with an effect of -0.285 
to being almost most twice as strong and significant at the 5% level. For the other Chinese 
companies, the results did not change considerably having, in turn, excluded them from the 
analyses.    
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 The AIC is accordingly reduced to 1171.117, indicating substantially better fit.   
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The second group of companies to be excluded consists of Gazprom and British Gas (BG). 
Being predominately preoccupied with exploration and production of natural gas, these 
companies operate in a market, which in some important respects, differs from the oil 
market.
40
 In model IP2, the exclusion of BG leads to a slightly stronger interaction effect, 
which is now also significant, albeit at the 10% level only. Furthermore, excluding BG from 
model IP4 does strengthen the interaction effect (-0.404). The interaction effect now also 
displays significance at the 5% level. Removing Gazprom from the sample does not alter the 
results in any particular way.  
4.5 Robustness tests 
To evaluate the robustness of the results provided in table 4.4 and 4.5 I apply several 
robustness tests. First, as the classification rule that separates larger from smaller 
multinational petroleum companies may greatly influence the results, in the fist robustness 
test, the smaller companies of Apache (295), Hess (301), Anadarko (302), Occidental (302), 
OMV (302), BG (306) and CNOOC (314) were separated from the other companies, together 
forming the group of smaller multinational petroleum companies.
41
 Having refitted model IP1 
to IP5, using the new classification rule, most of the interaction terms displayed remarked 
shifts in direction, with many of models now displaying results in accordance with the 
hypotheses formulated in chapter two. From these results then, it thus seems that the results 
displayed in table 4.4 are suffering from a lack of robustness, which stems from their 
sensitivity to how company size is operationalised.  
Second, since multinational petroleum companies with 100% state ownership may not be 
subject to the same market scrutiny as companies with commercial shareholders, the 
ownership variable was respecified, now distinguishing multinational petroleum companies 
with 100% state ownership from companies, in which all or some of the shares are being 
commercially traded. The results from running model IS1 to IS5, using the new ownership 
variable, displayed only minor deviations from the findings reported in table 4.5. Based on 
these findings, it thus appears that the findings, reported in table 4.5, are not dependent on the 
classification rule that separates private from state owned companies.  
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 Since the commercial value of natural gas is lower than for oil, economic rents from gas are considerably 
lower than that from oil. 
41
 PIW values in parentheses. 
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Third, a quick glance at the data shows that, with the exception of the Norwegian petroleum 
company Statoil, all petroleum companies from democratic home countries are classified as 
private according to 50% rule.
42
 According to the same rule, none of the petroleum companies 
from authoritarian home countries are private. While strictly speaking a property of home 
countries and not the petroleum companies as such, to test whether the results in table 4.5 
hold when the potentially confounding variable of the political regime in the home countries 
is taken into account, the ownership variable was substituted with a variable separating 
companies from democratic home countries from those that originate from authoritarian 
regimes. As expected, the results strongly indicated that companies from authoritarian 
regimes are less sensitive to political risk than companies from democracies. Based on these 
results, the more risk willingness of state owned petroleum companies may thus be explained 
by the differences between authoritarian home countries, which prefer state ownership to 
secure exclusive revenues and political control, and democratic home countries, in which 
better protection of private property and deregulations have produced a private market, on 
which private petroleum companies may flourish. 
Fourth, while there may be some regional effects, such as religion and history, which have not 
been accounted for and that may lead to spatial autocorrelation, to test if the results in table 
4.4 and 4.5 hold when different regions are, in turn, removed from the sample, the models 
were refitted, in turn excluding each of the following regions: 1) Sub Sahara Africa, 2) North 
Africa and the Middle East, 3) Latin America, 4) Former Soviet Union, and 5) Asia.
43
 With a 
few exceptions, the results from these models yielded similar results as in those provided in 
table 4.4 and 4.5. The most notable among the expectations is the effect of the CCI when 
North Africa and the Middle East is removed, in which the effect becomes positive, albeit 
non-significant, for both larger and private companies. Furthermore, when the Latin American 
countries are excluded, the effect of HDI also becomes negative for both the super majors and 
for private petroleum companies. Considering the robustness of the findings in table 4.4 and 
4.5 then, from these results, it thus appears to be increased support for the findings reported 
above, as testing for regional effects only generates minor deviance from the previous 
findings.       
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 Home countries classified as “Free” by Freedom House.    
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 As no region contains over 25% of the host countries, analysing each region separately would result in over 
fitted models. Thus, the regional effects are measures “negatively”. 
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Fifth, according to Jaffe (2007: 12-17) there is evidence that suggests that national petroleum 
companies are crowding out the super majors. Not only competing with the super majors in 
foreign operations, in many oil producing countries, large and increasingly confident national 
petroleum companies, are more or less functioning as energy agencies, with which foreign 
petroleum companies have to negotiate. Based on these assumptions, I included a dummy 
variable, separating host countries, in which it is a large national petroleum company, from 
those where foreign companies are confronted with less organised domestic competition.
44
  
The results from refitting the models showed that the presence of national petroleum 
companies does not considerably alter the findings displayed in table 4.4 and 4.5. 
Sixth, operating within an industry that is influenced by a cartel of producers, the investment 
allocation of multinational petroleum companies are likely to be influenced by the policies of 
the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Encompassing twelve of the 
countries in the sample, OPEC has, from its beginning in the 1960s, played a key role in 
forming the petroleum policy of its member states, most notably as an arena for negotiations 
and information sharing, and as a framework of decision making and monitoring (Claes 2001: 
131-171). Confronted with new market conditions, scholars, such as Claes (2001), has, 
however, raised questions about the rational for coordinating petroleum policies of producers 
with a highly diverse set of interests. As it turns out, one of the rationales behind continued 
cooperation is to balance the interest of major producers against the interests of other 
important market actors, such as multinational petroleum companies and consumers (ibid.: 
91). Based on the abovementioned considerations, to test whether results, depicted in table 4.4 
and 4.5, are influenced by OPEC policies towards the multinational petroleum companies, the 
twelve member countries were thus removed from sample. While leading to somewhat 
weaker effects, the new results predominately reproduced the results shown table 4.4 and 4.5, 
further corroborating to the robustness of the main findings.  
4.6 Summary of findings 
The two analyses conducted in this thesis have both generated some interesting, though at 
times, contradicting results. As seen in table 4.8, hypotheses 1a to 5a are all weakened by the 
findings, as the largest petroleum companies, here denoted as the super majors, appear to be 
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 Since the new variable also includes instances where the multinational petroleum companies are also the 
national petroleum company this variable is likely to be highly significant. The selection of countries are based 
on the whether they have companies at the PIW top 50 ranking and that they hold shares in the company.    
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more sensitive to political risk than the rest of the companies included in the analysis. These 
results are, however, associated with considerable uncertainty with robustness tests having 
shown that the smallest companies are generally more sensitive than the rest. For hypotheses 
1b to 5b, the results are somewhat encouraging, as they generally seem to conform to 
expectations. 
Table 4.8 Summary of findings 
Hypothesis Support 
1a: Larger multinational petroleum companies are more likely than smaller multinational 
petroleum companies to be present with upstream FDI in countries with a lower degree of 
democracy.  
Weaker 
(Contingent) 
  
1b: State owned multinational petroleum companies are more likely than private multinational 
petroleum companies to be present with upstream FDI in countries with a lower degree of 
democracy. 
Stronger 
  
  
2a: Larger multinational petroleum companies are more likely than smaller multinational 
petroleum companies to be present with upstream FDI in countries with a higher degree of 
political instability and likelihood of civil war.  
Weaker 
(Contingent) 
  
2b: State owned multinational petroleum companies are more likely than private multinational 
petroleum companies to be present with upstream FDI in countries with higher levels of 
political instability and likelihood of civil war. 
Stronger 
  
  
3a: Larger multinational petroleum companies are more likely than smaller multinational 
petroleum companies to be present with upstream FDI in countries with a lower degree of 
human development and a higher degree of poverty.  
Weaker 
(Contingent) 
  
3b: State owned multinational petroleum companies are more likely than private multinational 
petroleum companies to be present with upstream FDI in countries with a lower level degree of 
human development and a higher degree of poverty.  
Stronger 
(Contingent) 
  
4a: Larger multinational petroleum companies are more likely than smaller multinational 
petroleum companies to be present with upstream FDI in countries with a lower degree of 
regulatory quality. 
Weaker 
  
  
4b: State owned multinational petroleum companies are more likely than private multinational 
petroleum companies to be present with upstream FDI in countries with a lower degree of 
regulatory quality. 
Stronger 
  
  
5a: Larger multinational petroleum companies are more likely than smaller multinational 
petroleum companies to be present with upstream FDI in countries with a higher degree of 
corruption.  
Weaker 
(Contingent) 
  
5b: State owned multinational petroleum companies are more likely than private multinational 
petroleum companies to be present with upstream FDI in countries with a higher degree of 
corruption. 
Stronger 
(Contingent) 
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5 Explanations and implications 
Having described and evaluated the results from the analyses in chapter four, in this chapter, 
the results are subjected to a more thorough discussion, in which theoretical considerations 
are applied in the effort to explain the results. Furthermore, as science should be an 
accumulative undertaking, I will also discuss theoretical and methodological implications of 
this thesis. Here, the focus is on how the thesis may contribute to the research on the 
determinants of FDI and why the application of multilevel modelling should become more 
prominent within the field of political economy. 
5.1 Explanation 1: Why bigger is not always better 
In the first analysis, the aim was to analyse whether company size could modify the effect of 
political risk. The basic assumption in this analysis was that larger petroleum companies 
should be more likely to invest in host countries with a higher degree of perceived political 
risk, due to their superior O-specific advantages. Contrary to this assumption, the results from 
the formal analysis indicated that the super majors are more sensitive to political risk than the 
rest of the petroleum companies, when deciding where to allocate upstream FDI. However, as 
suggested by the robustness tests, when the smallest companies are compared to the other 
companies, there is a change of direction, providing results that are in accordance with 
hypotheses 1a to 5a. Based on these results, the relationship between company size and 
sensitivity to political risk could be described as a U-shaped curve, where, at the beginning, 
the sensitivity to political risk decreases with larger company size. Having reached a certain 
threshold, however, the sensitivity to political risk starts to rise again.  
To explain why the world’s largest petroleum companies should be less sensitive to political 
risk when deciding where to allocate their upstream FDI, the analyses have so far applied a 
capacity perspective. Here, larger companies, privileged with more capital, better negotiation 
power and with better access to the means necessary to protect production facilities and 
employees, are assumed to be equipped with better risk mitigation capacity than their smaller 
competitors. Although it is too early to write off the capacity perspective, in light of the 
results provided in the previous chapter, three other perspectives may offer some alternative 
explanations of why the super majors are seemingly so risk averse. 
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5.1.1 The industrial organisation perspective 
According to the industrial organisation perspective, recent developments within the 
international petroleum industry have been more unfavourable to the super majors than to 
their smaller competitors. First of all, as many of the largest producers of petroleum resources 
have grown more mature, they are seeking to regain their control over reserves and 
production, which were lost during in the 1950s and the 1960s. As mentioned earlier, one of 
the most important elements in this development has been the growth of national petroleum 
companies, which as of 2007 controlled nearly 80% of the global reserves (Jaffe 2007: 36). 
Leading to less oil and gas being available to multinational petroleum companies, there are 
reasons to believe that the super majors are suffering the most from this development, as they 
have a competitive advantage  in the development of larger fields (ibid.: 36).  
Related to the first argument, as there have been important changes in the legal framework 
that regulates transactions within the extractive industries, today, multinational petroleum 
companies are operating within an international petroleum market, where traditional 
concessions have been replaced by more partnership oriented contracts, such as production 
sharing agreements and joint ventures (Moran 2009: 1-42). An important implication of this 
change in the governance of petroleum resources is that the equity shares, available to 
multinational petroleum companies, are becoming smaller. As larger petroleum companies, in 
general, and the super majors in particular, are dependent on projects that meet their higher 
materiality demands, these companies may become less willing to engage in risky upstream 
ventures, as the potential payoffs do not justify being exposed to higher levels of political 
risk. 
The third and final element in the industrial organisation perspective concerns the on going 
outsourcing of different stages of the production chain within the petroleum industry (Stabell 
2006: 94). Although predominately confined to other parts of the production chain than those 
encompassing upstream activity, recently, there has been a trend towards more exploration 
and production activities being conducted by specialised service companies. With regard to 
the results from the first analysis, the rise of an independent service companies should, first 
and foremost, curtail the geographical expansion of the super majors. The reason for this is 
that similar to the super majors, the service companies are usually equipped with state of the 
art technology, which makes these companies attractive to producer countries. All things 
equal, this should lead to a reduced likelihood that the super majors are present in countries 
79 
 
with a high level of perceived political risk. Furthermore, as even the super majors are buying 
the services of service companies, the super majors may, in fact, be indirectly exposed to 
political risk through the operations of the service companies. These operations are, however, 
not covered by the analyses conducted in this thesis. 
5.1.2 The international relations perspective 
Just as market conditions may offer an explanation for why larger petroleum companies 
appear to be less willing to invest in countries with higher levels of political risk, in 
accordance with the international relations perspective, foreign policy considerations of major 
producer and consumer countries are likely to influence the geographical allocation of 
upstream FDI of multinational petroleum companies. There are at least two reasons why the 
effect of foreign policies should be particularly pronounced for the super majors. First of all, 
as a majority of the super majors originate from the U.S., American foreign policies and 
geopolitical considerations may play an important role in limiting the allocation freedom of 
the super majors. For example, following amendments of the Iran Sanction Act (ISA), in 
2010, U.S. President Barack Obama signed into law the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
Accountability and Divestment Act (CISADA), which increases the scope of sanctions 
directed against persons and companies “making an investment that directly and significantly 
contributes to the enhancement of Iran’s ability to develop its petroleum resources” (U.S. 
Department of State 2011). Rendering Iran an unviable destination for upstream FDI by U.S. 
based companies, the political actions taken against Iran, the country with the world’s second 
largest proved oil reserves, provides an example of how geopolitical consideration can 
influence the geographical allocation of upstream FDI, thereby contributing to the findings in 
the first analysis.
45
   
Besides American foreign policy, energy security considerations of emerging economies may 
explain why the super majors appear to be more sensitive to political risk when compared to 
the somewhat smaller companies. Defined by Yergin (1988: 111), as the objective “to assure 
adequate, reliable supplies of energy at reasonable prices and in ways that do not jeopardize 
major national values and objectives”, an important implication is that governments in 
countries that experience rapid economic growth should have strong incentives to encourage 
increased foreign activity by their domestic companies. With the Asian state owned petroleum 
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 As of 2010, none of the U.S. based petroleum companies were present with upstream FDI in Iran. 
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companies serving as the most frequently used examples of how governments concerns over 
energy security may lead petroleum companies to invest in countries with higher levels of 
political risk, these companies, of which most are classified as small, are assumed to be 
important actors in a political strategy, which motivated by diversification of oil and gas 
supplies, involves political negotiations where the companies’ access to foreign oil and gas 
deposits is being repaid in the form of construction and development of critical infrastructure.  
5.1.3 The endogenous risk perspective 
Pointing the finger at the petroleum companies themselves as an important source of political 
risk, the endogenous risk perspective builds on theories provided by the “resources curse” 
literature. According to these theories, countries with substantial natural resources tend to 
suffer from lower levels of economic and social development due to deteriorating 
competiveness of tradable industries and the degradation of political institutions (Ross 1999: 
297-322; Sachs and Warner 2001: 827- 838). If correct, one possible implication of these 
theories would be that the presence of multinational petroleum companies, in general, and the 
super majors in particular, may contribute to increasing levels of political risk, as petroleum 
companies are key players in the realisation of petroleum rents. Furthermore, as suggested by 
Collier and Hoeffler (2005: 630-631), oil, and perhaps to a somewhat lesser degree, gas, are 
important ingredients in civil war, as these are commodities that are highly suitable as loots. 
Finally, as extraction of oil and gas may give rise to environmental and social externalities, 
conflicts between multinational petroleum companies and local communities are likely to 
occur. Although measures to create local content, such as CSR strategies, may reduce the 
economic and social impact of exploration and production, there are reasons to believe that 
environmental and social degradation would increase the propensity of indigenous people, 
and members of local communities, to engage in criminal activity targeting production 
facilities and employees of multinational petroleum companies. Following from this, larger 
companies may indeed be more sensitive to political risk, as being bigger also means being 
more exposed to the potentially destructive reactions from affected third parties. 
5.2 Explanation 2: Authoritarian ownership 
While analyses of the risk-moderating effect of company size did provide negative or 
somewhat contradicting results, the results from analysing interactions between state 
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ownership and political risk did show that state owned petroleum companies, in some 
important respects, are less sensitive to political risk than private petroleum companies when 
making decisions about the geographical allocation of upstream FDI. As revealed by the 
robustness tests, however, these results are just as likely to be caused by the fact that almost 
all state owned companies are also “authoritarian owned” companies. Based on this I will 
shortly debate how authoritarian ownership may influence the risk willingness of 
multinational petroleum companies. 
Stating the almost obvious, there are good reasons to believe that companies from 
authoritarian regimes are not subjected to the same political pressure to stay away from 
countries, in which the citizens are deprived from basic democratic rights, and where there are 
widespread poverty and corruption. Moreover, as these home countries do not have a 
functioning oppositions and reliable sources of information, such as a free press, citizens and 
civil society groups, who would otherwise have played an important role in monitoring the 
operations of the state owned company, are deprived of valuable information about the 
business conduct of state owned petroleum companies. As a majority of the host countries, 
considered in these analyses, are themselves authoritarian, it is therefore a considerable 
potential for inter-autocracy trading, of which one important implication is that state owned 
companies from authoritarian regimes may enjoy a particular O-specific advantage in the 
form of reduced institutional and cultural distance (CD). According to Shenkar (2001: 520), 
the concept of cultural distance has been widely used to explain where and how FDI is 
undertaken. Most commonly it is assumed that smaller cultural distances encourage FDI, as 
the uncertainty that usually accompanies foreign ventures is more limited when investing in 
countries with more similar institutions and culture (Kogut and Singh 1988: 413-414). Given 
that 1) authoritarianism is capable of influencing political and social institutions and 
organisational cultures, and 2) that authoritarian regimes share a higher level of institutional 
and cultural similarity when compared to democracies, this may explain why authoritarian 
owned petroleum companies are more likely to invest in countries with higher degrees of 
perceived political risk.  
By application of principal-agent theories Hartley and Medlock III (2007: 1-59) argue that 
managers of fully state owned petroleum companies do enjoy considerable discretionary 
power, since they are not subjected to the same scrutiny from the market as managers of 
publicly traded companies. As these managers are usually assumed to be following short-term 
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objectives, such as the rapid expansion of the corporation, in the long run, however, state 
owned petroleum companies generally achieve lower returns than their private competitors 
(Noreng 2006: 124). Authoritarian owners may have other incentives than to maximise long-
term revenues from foreign investments. Since the power of authoritarian rulers is not 
grounded in popular support, they must find other ways to legitimise their reign. One way of 
achieving this is to buy off influential societal groups, which would otherwise join the 
opposition (Ross 2011: 3-4). Other measures to sustain political support involve the hiring of 
workers, loyal to the regime, by the state owned company (Biglaiser and Danis 2002: 85). 
Based on this, authoritarian owners may therefore perceive exclusive, albeit short-term 
revenues, as justifying the somewhat lower long-term returns, which, all things equal, should 
lead to less sensitivity to political risk (Hartley and Medlock III 2007: 13-14).
46
  
Although several producers have joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI), none of the owners of the state owned multinational petroleum companies considered 
in this, have agreed to regularly publicise “all material [on] oil, gas and mining payments by 
companies to governments (“payments”) and all material revenues received by governments 
from oil, gas and mining companies (“revenues”)” (EITI 2011). By not complying with the 
principles and criteria of the EITI, the operation of most state owned multinational petroleum 
companies are therefore not subjected to regular scrutiny. This should make state owned 
companies more likely to engage in upstream activities in countries with a higher degree of 
perceived political risk, as unethical business conduct, such as corruption, is unlikelier to 
cause punishment from competitors and international organisations.  
5.3 Implication 1 (theoretical): Contingent and 
institutional O-specific advantages 
Despite the fact that the eclectic OLI framework does not purport to be a testable theory, but 
“an analytical framework within which particular explanations of the determinants of MNE 
activity can be incorporated and appraised” (Dunning and Lundan 2008: 114), in this thesis I 
have made an effort to test one of the main tenets of the framework. Based on the assumption 
that larger petroleum companies are more likely to possess unique and sustainable O-specific 
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 There is a potentially contradicting mechanism in play when analysing the time perspective of authoritarian 
rulers. While authoritarian governments, in fear of getting overthrown in the near future, may favour short-term 
profits it is also possible to argue that they are not so dependent on short-term profits, as they are not responsible 
to the people. Here it is, however, assumed that the former type of consideration dominates the latter.    
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advantages when compared to smaller companies, a major claim in this thesis was that larger 
petroleum companies should be more capable of mitigating political risk. This was believed to 
lead these companies to invest more in countries, in which there is a high degree of perceived 
political risk. Contrary to these assumptions, however, it turned out that the world’s largest 
petroleum companies are less likely to commence exploration and production in high risk 
countries. How then, should these results be interpreted in light of the OLI framework? 
5.3.1 Contingent O-specific advantages 
To explain why company size appears to be an O-specific disadvantage when considering the 
willingness to being exposed to, and the ability to mitigate, political risk, I have mainly been 
concentrating on exogenous explanations, most notably market changes and the foreign 
policies of the world’s great powers. In light of these explanations, the scope and the nature of 
O-specific advantages is thus portrayed as being contingent on changes in the “operating 
milieu” of multinational petroleum companies (Narula 2010: 42). While, in my opinion, the 
basic OLI does not sufficiently address the importance of exogenous factors, extensions of the 
framework do provide suggestions of how market changes and foreign policy may interfere 
with the functioning of O-specific advantages.  
Responding to the same type of criticism, which was forwarded in the previous section, 
Dunning (2001: 178-179) presents a heuristic equation, which illustrates how exogenous 
factors may lead to changes in the nature and the scope of O-specific advantages. Expressed 
in terms changes in the OLI configuration, the equations goes as follow:   
OLIt1 = ƒ(OLIt0 St-n ∆St0→t1 ∆ENti →t1 ∆EXt0→t1),   
where OLIt0 is the configuration of the OLI advantages in the previous period, St-n the strategy 
pursued up to to  and which is still be worked out, ∆St0→t1 the strategic changes in the OLI 
configuration between t0 and t1,  and ∆ENti→t1 and ∆EXt0→t1 the changes in the endogenous 
and exogenous environment of the company.  
From the equation, it seems that exogenous factor, such as market changes and political 
constraints can be incorporated into the OLI framework, thereby taking into account the 
contingency of O-specific advantages. As such, the extended OLI framework is able to 
provide suggestions of how multinational petroleum companies will respond to political risk 
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under changing market conditions and politically induced constraints. On the other hand, 
despite being able to incorporate exogenous factors, the OLI framework does seem to 
overestimate multinational companies’ ability to smoothly adapt to fundamental changes in 
their political and economic environment. Potentially turning an earlier advantage into a 
disadvantage, this may explain why the super majors are currently unable to exploit their 
other O-specific advantages, thereby contributing to the allocation of upstream FDI 
discovered in the previous chapter. 
5.3.2 Institutional O-specific advantages 
Complementing explanations provided by the capacity perspective, in chapter four an 
additional explanation for why state owned petroleum companies appear to be less sensitive 
to political risk was that they are predominately subjected to authoritarian ownership. As a 
consequence, it was proposed that state owned petroleum companies enjoy a particular O-
specific advantages in the form of “institutional compatibility” when they invest in countries 
with a high degree of political risk. Furthermore, it was claimed that authoritarian owners 
have shorter time horizons, making state owned petroleum companies more willing to be 
exposed to political risk. While the basic OLI framework is unable to account for these types 
of O-specific advantages, by separating O-specific advantage between property rights and/or 
intangible asset advantages (Oa), and institutional assets (Oi), extended versions of the OLI 
framework do provide plausible explanations for why state owned petroleum companies 
invest more in countries with a higher degree of political risk (Dunning and Lundan 2008: 
132-133).  
Given that institutions are defined in a broad sense, both formal and informal institutions are 
important explanations for why state owned companies invest more in host countries where 
there is a high degree of political risk (Dunning and Lundan 2008: 129-131). Considering the 
impact of formal institutions first, authoritarian owned petroleum companies are likely to 1) 
“enjoy” regulations that do not prohibit engagement in investment projects with negative 
humanitarian and environmental consequences, 2) an organisation structure based on 
authoritarian principles, in which workers are deprived of influence, and 3) a reward system 
which encourages risk taking behaviour. Similarly, the informal institutions are likely to 
contribute to institutional compatibility through 1) a corporate culture characterised by a 
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strong focus on the ends and 2) a management with beliefs, similar to those of governments of 
countries characterised by underdevelopment and poor functioning institutions. 
To summarise the theoretical implications of the analyses conducted in this thesis, it appears 
that the extended OLI framework is able to provide explanations for why the super majors, 
contrary to the hypotheses presented in chapter two, are less likely to be present in countries 
with a high degree of political risk. By dividing O-specific advantages into Oa and Oi 
advantages, the OLI framework does also provide explanations for why authoritarian owned 
petroleum companies are more likely than private petroleum companies to be found investing 
in the same countries. The proposed explanations do, however, emphasis the importance of 
other kinds of O-specific advantages than those put forward in the basic OLI framework, 
where traditional O-specific advantages, such as capital and technology are given 
predominance. 
5.4 Implication 2 (methodological): The application 
of multilevel modelling in international political 
economy 
In this thesis I have applied multilevel modelling in my effort to analyse how O-specific 
advantages interact with sources of political risk to explain the geographical allocation of 
upstream FDI. As I do not intend to make a contribution to the debate over quantitative versus 
qualitative methods, I will start by saying that my choice of method was not and is not based 
on some conviction about the supremacy of quantitative methods. With this in mind, however, 
as the application of multilevel modelling, for reasons mentioned below, allows for more 
complexity and realism to be introduced into quantitative models, the application of 
multilevel modelling may indeed remedy some of most commonly noted weaknesses of 
quantitative methods, thereby providing scholars within the field of international political 
economy with an additional, and if taken full advantage of, sophisticated analytical tool. 
5.4.1 Structured data in international political economy 
Multilevel data structures are not uncommon in international political economy. Companies 
may be nested within countries or regions, countries may be nested within organisations, 
individuals may be nested within companies, and companies may be nested within industries. 
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Despite the multilevel nature of many of the phenomena studied in international political 
economy, however, “throughout much of the history of the health and social sciences, 
investigators have tended to use analytic tools that could not handle these types of multilevel 
data and theories” (Luke 2004: 2). In this thesis, the application of multilevel modelling was 
first and foremost motivated by the assumption that that host countries (level 1) could be 
regarded as nested within the investment portfolio of multinational petroleum companies 
(level 2). Furthermore, the geographical allocation of upstream FDI was assumed to be result 
of the cross level interaction between the O-specific advantages of multinational petroleum 
companies, and the perceived level of political risk in host countries.  
To explain how O-specific advantages interact with political risk, the OLI framework was 
used as theoretical point of departure. Now, being an eclectic framework, which incorporates 
insights from several different theories, the OLI framework seeks to explain the 
internationalisation of production by focusing on properties of both companies and countries. 
In doing so, however, the framework implicitly assumes a multilevel data structure, where 
companies and countries interact across different analytical levels. This brings us to the focal 
point in this discussion, which is that many theories within international political economy do 
assume some kind of multilevel data structure. If these theories are to be tested with 
quantitative methods, scholars should therefore, at least, consider multilevel modelling, as this 
will yield more valid explanations of the outcome of interest, while also reducing the risk of 
making ecological fallacies.  
5.4.2 Too few higher level cases? 
An important limitation in this thesis has been the relatively few multinational petroleum 
companies for which there exists accessible and comparable information. Given that “the 
sample size at the highest level is the main limiting characteristic of the [multilevel] design”, 
the small number of multinational petroleum companies covered by this thesis, may thus 
render the multilevel model less effective (Snijders 2005: 2). Problems, such as the one 
encountered in this thesis, are likely to be particularly persuasive within the field of 
international political economy, where the number of typical higher level observations, such 
as countries, industries or regions, are restricted by the size of the population. To remedy the 
problem, a common strategy is therefore to include the temporal dimension, which through 
repeated measures of higher level observations, could increase the number of higher level 
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observations considerably. Unfortunately, this strategy is too often hampered by incomplete 
and unreliable data, which seems to be endemic to the field of international political economy.  
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6 Conclusion 
In this thesis I sought to make some further contributions to the understanding of how 
political risk influences the geographical allocation of upstream foreign direct investments 
within the petroleum industry. As the theoretical point of departure I applied Dunning’s 
eclectic OLI framework, from which ownership specific advantages were conceptualised 
along the lines of company size and state ownership. Complementing these theories, to 
explain how political risk is generated and how this affects foreign investors, I used several 
different theories. Providing suggestions about the effect of political regime, political 
instability, human development and poverty, and regulatory quality and corruption, based on 
these theories I then formulated hypotheses, which were analysed using logistic multilevel 
modelling. In these models the focal point was to test whether company size and state 
ownership can moderate the effect of political risk. This was achieved by including cross 
level interaction terms. The analyses did yield some interesting results. First, contrary to the 
assumption made in formulating hypotheses 1a to 5a, the results from the first analysis 
showed that the world’s largest petroleum companies are less likely than their smaller 
counterparts to be present with upstream FDI in host countries where there is a high degree of 
perceived political risk. Submitted to robustness test, these results proved robust against 
several alterations of the sample. However, the same robustness test also revealed that the 
results are likely to be dependent on how company size is operationalised, with the smallest 
multinational petroleum companies turning out as more sensitive to political risk than the rest.  
Second, conforming to the expectations expressed in hypotheses 1b to 5b, state ownership 
seems to increase the likelihood that multinational petroleum companies are present in host 
countries with a higher degree of perceived political risk. Similar to the findings from the first 
analysis, these results appeared to be robust confronted with altered samples. When controlled 
for home country political regime, a clear pattern nevertheless emerged, with all state owned 
companies, except Statoil, originating from authoritarian regimes. The potential effect of this 
omitted variable was debated in some detail in chapter four, in which the basic argument was 
that authoritarian owned companies enjoy a competitive advantage when it comes to 
investments in countries where there is a higher degree of political risk. 
What then do these findings mean?  First and foremost, although some of the results did 
contradict expectations, the results indicate that there are some important differences between, 
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on one hand, smaller and larger companies and, on the other hand, state owned and private 
companies with regard to how these companies evaluate the significance of political risk in 
current and prospective host countries. Moreover, as discussed extensively in the previous 
chapter, while traditional ownership specific advantages, such as capital and technology, may 
still influence the capability to mitigate political risk, factors, external to multinational 
petroleum companies, are likely to play an equally important role in determining the 
geographical allocation of upstream FDI. Among the most important of these factors are 
changes in the organisation of the petroleum market, foreign policies of major consumer (and 
producer) countries and the political regime in the home countries. As such, the effect of 
political risk on the geographical allocation of upstream FDI must be understood and 
interpreted within an industrial and political context, where changing conditions, at times, 
may render some multinational petroleum companies more capable of and more willing to 
invest in countries with a higher degree of perceived political risk. This is why O-specific 
advantages are contingent.   
Considering the methodological implications of thesis, having chosen a quantitative approach, 
I was able to analyse several of the key actors within the petroleum industry. The application 
of multilevel modelling further allowed me to analyse structured data in a rigorous manner, 
with the inclusion of cross level interaction terms providing an effective means to test the 
significance of the moderating effect of company size and state ownership. On the other hand, 
as indicated by the discussion in the previous chapter, the relatively low number of higher 
level observations does represent an important limitation with regard to the external validity 
of the results provided by this thesis. In a similar fashion, the inability to incorporate the 
temporal dimension means that generalisations should be done with caution, as variables that 
changes over time, such as the price of oil and gas, are not captured by this thesis. As proved 
by the recent events in North Africa and the Middle East, political risk is likely to continue to 
influence the operations of multinational petroleum companies in the foreseeable future. 
Provided with better data, analyses such as the ones conducted in this thesis could offer some 
important suggestions of how these events come about and how civil unrest and opportunism 
on behalf of host country governments influences the geographical allocation of upstream 
FDI. To get a complete picture, these methods should, however, be complemented with in-
depth studies, of which one of the most important contributions would be more valid 
measurements of political risk and of the factors determining the risk mitigation capacity of 
multinational companies. 
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Appendix A: Companies and countries in 
the analyses 
Companies 
 
Countries 
Name Nationality PIW % state owned 
 
Algeria Mexico 
Exxon Mobil U.S. 37 0 
 
Angola Myanmar 
CNPC China 53 100 
 
Argentina Nigeria 
BP U.K 55 0 
 
Azerbaijan Oman 
Shell The Netherlands 65 0 
 
Bangladesh Pakistan 
ConocoPhillips U.S. 87 0 
 
Bolivia Peru 
Chevron U.S. 90 0 
 
Brazil Phillipenes 
Total France 90 0 
 
Brunei Qatar 
KPC Kuwait 101 100 
 
Cameroon Rep.Congo 
Sonatrach Algeria 103 100 
 
Chad Russia 
Gazprom Russia 109 50.0023 
 
China Saudi Arabia 
Petrobras Brazil 113 32.2 
 
Colombia Sudan 
Lukoil Russia 127 0 
 
Cuba Syria 
Petronas Malaysia 129 100 
 
Ecuador Tanzania 
Eni Italy 141 30 
 
Egypt Thailand 
Sinopec China 173 75.84 
 
Eq.Guinea Trinidad and Tobago 
Statoil Norway 184 65 
 
Gabon Tunisia 
Repsol Spain 188 0 
 
India Turkmenistan 
ONGC India 228 74.14 
 
Indonesia UAE 
Marathon U.S. 236 0 
 
Iran Uzbekistan 
Apache U.S. 295 0 
 
Iraq Venezuela 
Hess  U.S. 301 0 
 
Ivory Coast Vietnam 
Anardarko U.S. 302 0 
 
Kazahkstan Yemen 
Occidental U.S. 302 0 
 
Kuwait 
 
OMV Austria 302 30.5 
 
Libya 
 
BG U.K. 306 0 
 
Malaysia 
 
CNOOC China 314 66.41 
 
Mauretania 
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Appendix B: The sample in numbers 
Countries   
Oil exporting countries, world 91 
Oil exporting countries, non OECD 65 
Oil exporting countries, sample 50 
Coverage, world 0.55 
Coverage, non OECD 0.77 
  
Reserves, oil (bbl) 
 
Reserves, world 1 317 447 415.00 
Reserves, non OECD 1 098 043 230.00 
Reserves, sample 1 087 341 040.00 
Coverage, world 0.83 
Coverage, non OECD 0.99 
  
Reserves, gas (bcf) 
 
Reserves, world 6 128 212.00 
Reserves, non OECD 5 703 627.00 
Reserves, sample 4 650 114.00 
Coverage, world 0.92 
Coverage, non OECD 0.99 
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Appendix C: Descriptive statistics 
Dependent variable: presence of upstream 
FDI
 
 
Company size: PIW2 
 
State ownership: S_ownship2 
 
Risk and control variables 
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Appendix D: Correlations in preliminary 
analysis 
 
ln_poilres ln_pgasres ln_inflation ln_population wto fhi_rev psi hdi rqi cci 
 
                    
ln_poilres 1.0000                   
ln_pgasres 0.7000 1.0000                 
ln_inflation 0.1485 0.2683 1.0000               
ln_population 0.1161 0.1901 0.0603 1.0000             
wto -0.1453 -0.2429 -0.4260 0.0958 1.0000           
fhi_rev 0.0272 -0.0495 -0.1594 0.2140 0.4828 1.0000         
psi 0.2252 0.1374 -0.2085 -0.5556 0.0929 -0.0204 1.0000       
hdi 0.4771 0.4661 -0.1342 -0.2835 0.0013 0.2075 0.6666 1.0000     
rqi 0.2081 0.0883 -0.5357 -0.1274 0.4567 0.4251 0.4627 0.5197 1.0000   
cci 0.3757 0.3509 -0.3524 -0.1990 0.4044 0.3348 0.5335 0.6391 0.8169 1.0000 
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Appendix E: VIF values with centered 
PIW2 and S_ownship2 
VIF values in model IP1-IP5 
  Model IP1 Model IP2 Model IP3 Model IP4 Model IP5 
fhi_rev 1.80 
    psi 
 
2.79 
   hdi 
  
1.80 
  rqi 
   
4.44 
 cci 
    
5.25 
piw2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
piw2_fhi 1.00 
    piw2_psi 
 
1.00 
   piw2_hdi 
  
1.00 
 
1.00 
piw2_rqi 
   
1.01 
 piw2_cci         1.00 
 
VIF values in model IS1-IS5 
  Model IS1 Model IS2 Model IS3 Model IS4 Model IS5 
fhi_rev 1.80 
    psi 
 
2.79 
   hdi 
  
3.32 
  rqi 
   
4.46 
 cci 
    
5.26 
s_ownship2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
s_ownship2_fhi 1.00 
    s_ownship2_psi 
 
1.00 
   s_ownship2_hdi 
  
1.00 
  s_ownship2_rqi 
   
1.01 
 s_ownship2_cci         1.00 
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Appendix F: Summary of influential 
observations 
Level-1 observations 
Model Country Risk coeff. Int. term Joint sig. 
IP2 Libya 0.413** -0.325* 0.0002 
 
Colombia 0.634*** -0.316* 0.0000 
IP3 Nigeria 2.930** -2.892** 0.0002 
IP4 Libya 0.585** -0.321 0.0001 
 
Colombia 0.524** -0.315 0.0003 
IP5 Russia -0.817*** -0.306 0.0000 
 
Colombia -0.640** -0.262 0.0000 
* p < 0.10   ** p < 0.05   *** p < 0.01     
 
Model Country Risk coeff. Int. term Joint sig. 
IS3 Nigeria 2.941** 4.789*** 0.0012 
 
Saudi Arabia 1.789* -4.181*** 0.0043 
IS5 Russia -0.689** -1.087*** 0.0000 
 
Algeria -0.569** -1.111*** 0.0000 
 
Colombia -0.484* -1.061*** 0.0000 
 
Saudi Arabia -0.462* -1.038*** 0.0000 
     * p < 0.10   ** p < 0.05   *** p < 0.01     
 
Level-2 observations 
Model Company Risk coeff. Int. eff. Joint sig. 
IP1 CNPC 0.234** -0.167* 0.0007 
IP2 CNPC 0.580*** -0.381** 0.0001 
 
BG 0.444** -0.313* 0.0002 
IP4 CNPC 0.846*** -0.600*** 0.0000 
 
BG 0.582** -0.404** 0.0002 
IP5 CNPC -0.378 -0.547** 0.0000 
* p < 0.10   ** p < 0.05   *** p < 0.01     
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Appendix G: Do-files and dataset (CD) 
